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LIFECYCLES OF COMPETITION 
SYSTEMS: EXPLAINING VARIATION IN 
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF NEW 
REGIMES 
WILLIAM E. KOVACIC* AND MARIANELA LOPEZ-GALDOS** 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
The emergence of competition law as a global enterprise is a remarkable 
development in economic regulation.1 For nearly a century after the adoption of 
the first national statutes in the late nineteenth century,2 competition law, or 
antitrust, was largely an American idiosyncrasy.3 This is no longer the case. Since 
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1.  See Umut Aydin & Tim Büthe, Competition Law & Policy in Developing Countries: Explaining
Variations in Outcomes; Exploring Possibilities and Limits, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2016, at 
2 (describing development of competition law and challenges faced by competition agencies). In this 
article, “competition law” encompasses the policy tools (including law enforcement, advocacy, research, 
market studies, and business education) that countries use to proscribe anti-competitive business 
practices and to promote the adoption of pro-competitive public policies. See William E. Kovacic, 
Institutional Foundations for Economic Legal Reform in Transition Economies: The Case of Competition 
Policy and Antitrust Enforcement, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 265, 281–86 (2001) [hereinafter Institutional 
Foundations] (describing policy tools that comprise competition law and policy).  
2.  See D. Jeffrey Brown, Introduction to Competition Law, in COMPETITION ACT & 
COMMENTARY 1, 6–13 (Stikeman Elliott LLP ed., 2015) (describing passage of Canada’s competition 
law in 1889).  
3. The United States enacted its first federal antitrust law, the Sherman Act, in 1890. Sherman Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (1982). The adoption of the statute is examined in MARTIN J. SKLAR, THE CORPORATE 
RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, 1890–1916, at 93–117 (1988). A small number of other 
jurisdictions established competition law systems in the century after the Sherman Act was passed. 
Notable additions took place in 1958 when Germany’s competition law took effect and the European 
Community, through the Treaty of Rome, adopted the competition articles that created the European 
Union’s competition law system. On the enactment of Germany’s competition law, see Gerard 
Braunthal, The Struggle for Cartel Legislation, in CASES IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS 187, 191–200 
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the late 1980s, the number of jurisdictions with competition laws has soared from  
roughly thirty to more than 130,4 and more are on the way.5 Many modern 
adopters are countries that once seemed immutably committed to central 
planning and government ownership as the foundations for economic progress 
until the recent past.6 
The astonishing global expansion of competition law has considerable 
economic significance beyond the well-established regimes in the European 
Union and the United States, which together had, until recently, functioned as a 
form of regulatory duopoly in international competition law since the early 
1990s.7 For large multinational companies, the establishment of new systems in 
Brazil and China and the makeover of India’s older, ineffective competition 
regime have transformed the planning of mergers and required reconsideration 
of practices such as the licensing of intellectual property.8 Though its Anti-
Monopoly Law only took effect in August 2008,9 China already is a peer of the 
European Union and the United States in its capacity to shape global norms of  
  
 
(James B. Chirstoph & Bernard E. Brown eds., 1965). The adoption of the competition articles of the 
Treaty of Rome is recounted in DAVID J. GERBER, LAW AND COMPETITION IN TWENTIETH CENTURY 
EUROPE: PROTECTING PROMETHEUIS 342–45 (Oxford University Press, paperback ed. 2001). 
 4.  See William E. Kovacic, The United States and Its Future Influence on Global Competition Policy, 
22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1157, 1157–58 & n.7 (2015) [hereinafter Influence] (describing global creation 
of competition law systems). The calculation of how many countries have competition law systems is an 
imprecise exercise. For a discussion of classification questions and other methodological issues, see Mark 
R.A. Palim, The worldwide growth of competition law: an empirical analysis, 43 ANTITRUST BULL., 
Spring 1998, at 105 [hereinafter Palim, Worldwide Growth].  
 5.  For example, Nigeria is moving toward enacting a competition law. Mark Briggs, Nigeria edges 
closer to competition law, GLOB. COMPETITION REV. (June 9, 2016), http://globalcompetition 
review.com/news/article/41227/nigeria-edges-closer-competition-law/ [https:// perma.cc/8STQ-B8W5]. 
 6.  The adoption of competition laws in the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and 
South Africa) is illustrative. Thirty years ago, these nations seemed unlikely to pursue market-based 
reforms and create competition systems. See generally COMPETITION LAW IN THE BRICS COUNTRIES 
(Adrian Emch et al. eds., 2012) (detailing establishment of competition law in BRICS nations); see also 
COMPETITION LAW AND ENFORCEMENT IN THE BRICS AND IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (Frederic 
Jenny & Yannis Katsoulacos eds., 2016) [hereinafter COMPETITION LAW AND ENFORCEMENT] 
(discussing development of competition law in BRICS nations and other developing countries). The 
adopters since 1990 are not only planned economies or developing countries. These include Austria, 
Italy, and the Netherlands. See NMa, Annual Report 1998, at 3 (1998), available at 
www.acm.nl/en/publications/publication/11598/NMa-1998-Annual-0Report/ [https://perma.cc/T775-
L98Y] (noting adoption by the Netherlands of its first competition law in 1998); www.agcm.it/en/ 
[https://perma.cc/TD2A-WSWH] (describing enactment of Italy’s first competition law in 1990). 
 7.  See William E. Kovacic, Dominance, Duopoly and Oligopoly: The United States and the 
Development of Global Competition Policy, 14 GLOB. COMPETITION REV. 39, 39 (2010) (recounting the 
development of the EU/U.S. competition law duopoly). 
 8.  See Kovacic, Influence, supra note 4, at 1158 (discussing the expansion in the number of the 
world’s competition systems and its significance for business decision making). 
 9.  Xiaoye Wang & Adrian Emch, Chinese Antitrust—a Snapshot, J. ANTITRUST ENF’T 12, 12–13 
& n.1 (Supp. Oct. 2015) (describing adoption and implementation of China’s Anti-monopoly Law). 
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business behavior.10 In the years to come, regional alliances such as the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations may achieve the same stature.11 
For students of regulation, the establishment of new competition law systems 
commands attention for another reason. The creation of so many new systems—
roughly 100 new regimes in barely twenty-five years12—provides an unmatched 
opportunity to study why regulatory institutions come into being, how they 
evolve, and what makes them succeed or fail in carrying out their legal mandates. 
Our unscientific impression is that there is no other field of economic policy in 
which so many jurisdictions adopted a new regulatory regime for the first time in 
so short a period.13 Competition law now encompasses an extraordinary array of 
 
 10. See generally CHINA’S ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW: THE FIRST FIVE YEARS (Adrian Emch & David 
Stallibras eds., 2013) (discussing how China’s Anti-monopoly Law has already shaped global business); 
see also Symposium, Competition Law in China Today, 3 J. ANTITRUST ENF’T 1 (Supp. Oct. 2015) 
(discussing development of China’s competition law system); Yane Svetiev & Lei Wang, Competition 
Law Enforcement in China: Between Technocracy and Industrial Policy, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 
no. 4, 2016, at 190. 
 11.  The Association of South East Asian Nation committed its members to adopt competition laws 
by the end of 2015. The association’s competition law treaty commitments appear at www.asean.org. This 
spurred the creation of new systems in Myanmar and the Philippines. The association recently launched 
the Competition Policy and Law Program to encourage cooperation and policy integration in 
competition law across the region. Calvin Hui, Singapore’s Competition Commission leads effort to align 
competition policy and law in ASEAN (Apr. 27, 2016), available at http://www.channelnewsasia. 
com/news/business/singapore/singapore-s-competition/2735476.html.  
 12.  See Aydin & Büthe, supra note 1, at 2 (describing diffusion of competition systems globally). 
We derive our estimate from several sources. We began with Mark Palim’s study in 1998, which identified 
jurisdictions with competition laws as of 1990. See Palim, Worldwide Growth, supra note 4, at 106–09 & 
n.15. We then identified adopters since 1990 with the George Washington University Law School’s 
Competition Law Center data base and the membership data for the International Competition Network. 
See Worldwide Competition Database, THE GEO. WASH. COMPETITION L. CTR., http://www.gwclc. 
com/World-competition-database.html [https://perma.cc/D3WP-9KEK] (compiling data on institutional 
characteristics of competition law systems); Members Directory, INT’L COMPETITION NETWORK, 
www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/members/member-directory.aspx [https://perma.cc/Z5YX-
K7VV].  
 13.  In the late 1980s and in the 1990s, many communist or socialist countries undertook market-
oriented economic reforms. The economic reform process in these countries is documented in THE 
EMERGENCE OF MARKET ECONOMIES IN EASTERN EUROPE (Christopher Clague & Gordon C 
Raussner eds., 1992) [hereinafter EMERGENCE] (describing economic reforms undertaken by transition 
economies after fall of Berlin Wall and dissolution of the Soviet Union). These changes reflected the 
realization that a successful transition to a market system required basic changes in the existing legal 
framework. See Mancur Olson, The Hidden Path to a Successful Economy, in EMERGENCE, supra, at 55, 
65 (“To realize all the gains from trade, . . . there has to be a legal system and political order that enforces 
contracts, protects property rights, carries out mortgage agreements, provides for limited liability 
corporations, and facilitates a lasting and widely used capital market that makes the investments and 
loans more liquid than they would otherwise be.”). Amid all economic law reform activity in this period, 
the breadth of adoption of competition laws seems unmatched. We tested our impression by examining 
the proceedings of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, whose programs 
support reforms to spur economic growth. ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., OECD 50TH 
ANNIVERSARY VISION STATEMENT 2 (2011) (“Throughout its history, the OECD . . . has assisted 
countries in fostering good governance and reforming and improving their economic policies to generate 
greater economic growth.”). The OECD operates through a framework of about 250 committees, expert 
groups, and working groups. See Hugh M. Hollman & William E. Kovacic, The International Competition 
Network: Its Past, Current and Future Role, 20 MINN. J. INT’L L. 274, 289 (2011) (describing operations 
of OECD). Our review of their work reveals no other area of economic regulation in which so many 
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jurisdictions in most parts of the world.14 Since 1990, the extensive 
experimentation with institutional design and policy implementation for 
competition law has elicited attention from scholars in economics, history, law, 
political science, and public administration.15 
This article examines one aspect of the global adoption of competition law 
systems: what jurisdictions must do to build the institutions needed for effective 
competition law implementation, and in particular, to develop programs that 
improve economic performance.16 Rather than assess whether recently-created 
competition systems have reduced prices, improved product quality, or 
stimulated innovation,17 this article analyzes how well various jurisdictions have 
created the institutional predicates for achieving these aims. 
This article discusses the topic of institutions and implementation as follows. 
Part II sets out the major assumptions that have guided our study of competition 
system lifecycles.18 It discusses the importance of institutional design and policy 
implementation capacity, and, focusing on institutional considerations, provides 
our own definition of what constitutes a “good” competition regime. 
Part III considers the specific obstacles that a jurisdiction must surmount to 
establish an effective competition law regime. In doing so, it emphasizes that the 
establishment of a well-functioning system in most jurisdictions is likely to be a 
relatively slow process. It suggests that it takes roughly twenty to twenty-five 
years from the adoption of a law to determine whether a new competition law 
regime is on the path to successful implementation over the longer term. In more 
 
jurisdictions have created new legal regimes in numbers comparable to competition law.  
 14.  See Aydin & Büthe, supra note 1, at 2 (describing the expansion of competition law systems). 
The broad geographic distribution of competition systems is evident from the membership of the 
International Competition Network. See Member Directory, INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION 
NETWORK, www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/members/membersdirectory.aspx (listing, by 
continent, International Competition Network members).  
 15. The multidisciplinary study of new competition systems is evident in the contributions to this 
issue of Law & Contemporary Problems. See, e.g., Aydin & Büthe, supra note 1 (collaboration between 
two political scientists to analyze the development of new competition systems); A.E. Rodriguez & 
Ashok Menon, The Causes of Competition Agency Ineffectiveness in Developing Countries, 79 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2016, at 37 (study by economists of limits on ability of competition agencies to 
implement policy successfully). 
 16.  Commentators identify improved economic performance (for example, greater productivity and 
increased innovation) as an important competition policy goal, but also suggest that competition law can 
help realize other aims, such as the reduction of corruption and poverty. See Competition law and Policy: 
drivers of economic growth and development, 4 COHERENCE FOR DEVELOPMENT 1 (Org. for Econ. 
Cooperation & Dev., Jan. 2015) (discussing competition law’s capacity to increase productivity and 
innovation, while also fighting corruption and reducing poverty). In focusing on improvements in 
economic performance, we are aware that nations adopt competition laws to achieve other policy goals. 
See Barak Orbach, The Goals of Antitrust, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2151 (2013) (discussing varied 
objectives of competition systems). We know of no jurisdiction that, in enacting and implementing a 
competition law, has been indifferent to the purpose of improving economic performance.  
 17.  A growing literature has sought to assess the economic impact of competition law enforcement 
decisions. See ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., REFERENCE GUIDE ON EX-POST EVALUATION 
OF COMPETITION AGENCIES’ DECISIONS (Apr. 2016) (presenting framework for ex post evaluation and 
reviewing studies of effects of competition agency decisions).  
 18.  See infra Part II. 
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difficult circumstances, the path can be longer. This calls for realism in setting 
expectations about what a competition system can do, and how quickly it can do 
it. 
Though the more than 100 competition systems formed since the late 1980s 
have evolved in different ways, some general patterns have emerged. Part IV 
presents the principal evolutionary paths that new competition systems have 
taken. We call these paths “lifecycles” to convey the notion that there are 
recurring patterns in how competition systems evolve. By studying system 
lifecycles, jurisdictions can improve the performance of existing competition 
regimes and can better anticipate and contend with obstacles to creating effective 
new systems. The path most closely associated with implementation success is a 
gradual upward sloping curve of progress—a condition that underscores the 
importance of sustained, incremental improvements to institutions entrusted 
with key implementation tasks. 
Part V presents factors that determine the rate at which new systems gain 
implementation proficiency. Key considerations include resources (financial 
outlays and human capital), agency leadership, political commitment and 
stability, and the quality of supporting institutions, such as courts and 
universities.19 
Part VI offers some conclusions about the path of implementation success. 
Given a choice between consumption in the form of starting new cases or other 
programs and investment in institution-building, new systems are well advised to 
emphasize investment when allocating resources in the first decades of their 
development. 
II 
INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND GOOD AGENCY PERFORMANCE 
This article’s basic premise is that improvements in institutional 
arrangements tend to yield superior policy outcomes. For much of the 1990s, the 
national and multinational donor organizations that fostered adoption of 
competition laws generally gave inadequate attention to institutional design and 
policy implementation.20 Organizations that advised nations in the formulation 
of new laws slighted the institutional arrangements that are vital to the successful 
implementation of new competition laws.21 Donors often measured their own 
success by the number of new laws adopted, without regard to the effectiveness 
or sustainability of the laws they helped implement.22 At the same time, the 
 
 19.  See infra Part V. 
 20.  See William E. Kovacic, Getting Started: Creating New Competition Policy Institutions in 
Transition Economies, 23 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 403, 404 (1997) [hereinafter Getting Started] (describing 
weak attention given to implementation concerns in the 1990s). 
 21.  See William E. Kovacic, Lucky Trip? Perspectives from a Foreign Advisor on  Competition 
Policy, Development and Technical Assistance, 3 EUROPEAN COMP. J. 319 (2007) [hereinafter Lucky 
Trip]. 
 22.  Kovacic, Getting Started, supra note 20, at 404. 
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competition law agendas of international organizations such as the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development were rich in discussions regarding 
what substantive competition programs systems should pursue but lean in 
treatment of how to effectuate them.23 
To a striking degree, policy implementation issues were seen as mere 
technical details to be sorted out once the competition law had been passed.24 In 
drafting new competition statutes, external advisors often provided off-the-rack 
solutions from other jurisdictions with little tailoring to account for local 
conditions or implementation capabilities.25 The prevailing wisdom also pressed 
toward adopting fully-loaded competition regimes that included the complete set 
of policy commands that were the norm in older systems such as the European 
Union and the United States.26 This development partly reflected the view that 
transition economies would have a single political opportunity to make basic 
economic reforms.27 If one assumed that the political will to enact reforms would 
evaporate, it became necessary to pack everything into the competition law from 
the outset. The possibility for future upgrades or gradual, phased implementation 
was seen as remote.28 
A. The Ascent Of Implementation Concerns 
Academic scholarship and government policymaking over the past fifteen 
years reveal a growing recognition that implementation issues demand close 
attention from day one of a law reform process.29 Statutes with grand policy 
aspirations but weak means for implementation can pointlessly consume 
resources from both public officials and business operators.30 Worse, they can 
engender cynicism about lawmaking and public administration generally in the 
eyes of citizens who too often have seen their governments promise too much 
and deliver too little.31 But implementation is increasingly getting the attention it 
deserves from academics, government officials, and practitioners. With greater 
 
 23.  The agenda of Policy Roundtables convened by the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development displays this tendency. Org. for Econ. Cooperation & Dev., Competition Committee, 
Policy Roundtables, www.oecd.org/competition/roundtables.htm [https://perma.cc/E26R-KZ8A]. Until 
the mid-2000s, the topics of these roundtables dealt predominantly with issues of substantive antitrust 
analysis. From the mid-2000s onward, one sees a larger number of sessions that address policy 
implementation concerns. 
 24.  See Kovacic, Getting Started, supra note 20, at 404. 
 25.  See generally Kovacic, Lucky Trip, supra note 21 (examining this tendency across several 
countries). On the dangers of this approach for law reform, see Jean-Jacques Laffont, Competition, 
Information, and Development, in ANNUAL WORLD BANK CONFERENCE ON DEVELOPMENT 1998 237 
(Boris Pleskovic & Joseph E. Stiglitz eds., 1999). 
 26.  See Kovacic, Getting Started, supra note 20, at 407. 
 27.  See Kovacic, Institutional Foundations, supra note 1, at 274–75. 
 28.  Kovacic, Institutional Foundations, supra note 1, at 274–75, 298–301. 
 29.  THE DESIGN OF COMPETITION LAW INSTITUTIONS:  GLOBAL NORMS, LOCAL CHOICES 
(Eleanor M. Fox & Michael J. Trebilcock eds., 2013); Michael J. Trebilcock & Edward M. Iacobucci, 
Designing Competition Law Institutions, 25 WORLD COMP. L. & ECON. REV. 361 (2002). 
 30.  See Kovacic, Getting Started, supra note 20, at 404. 
 31.  Kovacic, Getting Started, supra note 20, at 404. 
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frequency and intensity, discussions about competition law today address how to 
establish the institutional foundations necessary to achieve good policy results32 
as well as how to measure the effectiveness of different institutional 
configurations.33 
This article’s focus on lifecycles emphasizes the history of policy 
implementation across jurisdictions. Building a new regulatory system involves 
considerable experimentation with substantive policy approaches and 
implementation techniques.34 The capacity to learn from one’s own experience 
and from the collective experience of other institutions with similar 
responsibilities separates superior institutions from weaker regimes.35 This 
historical perspective guides the initial design and early operation of a regulatory 
system and, more importantly, informs the pursuit of refinements that improve 
performance over time.36 Agencies that embrace a virtuous cycle of 
experimentation, assessment, and refinement greatly boost their prospects for 
success.37 
 
 32. See, e.g., DANIEL A. CRANE, THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 
xi (2011) (“Institutions . . . are a critical and underappreciated driver of an antitrust policy that interacts 
in many subtle ways with substantive antitrust rules and decisions.”); ANNETJE OTTOW, MARKET AND 
COMPETITION AUTHORITIES: GOOD AGENCY PRINCIPLES (2015) (discussing generally how 
competition systems operate and their structural principles).  
 33.  See generally David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic, Competition Agency Design: What’s on 
the Menu?, 8 EUR. COMPETITION J. 527, 528–36 (2012) (assessing a variety of different competition 
agency design systems and how choices can affect future effectiveness of these systems). 
 34.  See generally William E. Kovacic, Evaluating Antitrust Experiments: Using Ex Post Assessments 
of Government Enforcement Decisions to Inform Competition Policy, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 843 (2001) 
(modeling antitrust enforcement as an experimental process and urging use of ex-post evaluation to 
assess outcomes of enforcement experiments). This is evident, for example, in the experience of the 
United States. The decision to create a second federal enforcement institution in 1914 (the Federal Trade 
Commission) can be seen as an experiment with administrative policy development as an alternative to 
enforcement of the antitrust laws by the Department of Justice in the federal courts. See Marc Winerman, 
The Origins of the FTC: Concentration, Cooperation, Control and Competition, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 62–
88, 90–92 (2003) (discussing legislative rationale for creation of FTC). The evolution of the Justice 
Department’s criminal enforcement program against cartels likewise has exhibited considerable 
experimentation and adjustment, especially since the mid-1970s. See William E. Kovacic, Criminal 
Enforcement Norms in Competition Policy: Insights from US Experience, in CRIMINALISING CARTELS 
45 (Caron Beaton-Wells & Ariel Ezrachi eds., 2011).  
 35.  See Marc Winerman & William E. Kovacic, Outpost Years for a Start-Up Agency: The FTC from 
1921 to 1925, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 145, 146–49 (2010) (describing value of historical study as way to  
understand the FTC and to identify challenges other agencies will face in the early period of their 
development); William E. Kovacic, The FTC at 100: Into Our Second Century 2-5 (Jan. 2009) [hereinafter 
FTC at 100], http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-100-our-
second-century/ftc100rpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/JUE2-BJKZ] (discussing benefits to FTC of 
benchmarking itself with other competition agencies).  
 36.  See generally Edward J. Balleisen & Elizabeth K. Brake, Historical Perspective and Better 
Regulatory Governance: An Agenda for Institutional Reform, 8 REG. & GOV. 222 (2014) (highlighting 
different ways in which regulatory agencies use history to make future  policy choices and evaluating 
historical perspectives in shaping regulatory policy). 
 37.  See William E. Kovacic, Achieving better practices in the design of competition policy institutions, 
50 ANTITRUST BULL. 511, 511–13 (Fall 2005) (making the case for a process of policy innovation that 
involves experimentation with new techniques, the identification of superior approaches through regular 
evaluation, and the adoption of better practices); William E. Kovacic, Politics and Partisanship in U.S. 
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B. Note On Methodology 
There is a large and growing body of literature on the development of new 
competition law systems.38 This reflects the exceptional number of research paths 
opened by the remarkable expansion of competition law as a global concern. This 
article builds upon this literature and draws upon three additional resources. One 
such resource is a benchmarking project undertaken by the George Washington 
University Law School’s Competition Law Center. This project has collected 
information about ten major institutional characteristics for the world’s 130 
competition law systems.39 The process of preparing this study has provided a 
valuable opportunity to use the information to see how individual systems have 
evolved. 
A second information source consists of reports and peer reviews prepared 
by the International Competition Network, the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, and the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development on matters related to competition law implementation.40 One 
of this article’s authors has written three of these reviews and is now engaged in 
a project to study the implementation of earlier recommendations in Ukraine.41 
The third source consists of interviews. The authors have spoken with current 
and former competition agency officials, practitioners, and academics, and have 
conducted site visits in various countries.42 These activities yield information that 
can be illuminating or untrustworthy—sometimes at the same time. There are 
many difficulties associated with relying on interviews to assess the quality of 
competition agencies or to form conclusions about how they evolved.43 Current 
 
Federal Antitrust Enforcement, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 687, 708 (2014) [hereinafter Partisanship] (describing 
three step process of experimentation, assessment, and refinement). 
 38.  See supra notes 12–15 and accompanying text (describing how establishment of new systems 
creates new opportunities for scholarly study). 
 39.  World Competition Database, supra note 12. 
 40.  The OECD’s peer reviews are collected at www.oecd.org [https://perma.cc/YJJ2-4SSM]. The 
UNCTAD peer reviews appear at www.unctad.org [https://perma.cc/3GAF-LACB]. 
 41.  Kovacic has co-authored UNCTAD peer reviews for Armenia, Pakistan, and Ukraine. 
UNCTAD, Voluntary Peer Review of Competition Law and Policy: Ukraine (July 5, 2013) [hereinafter 
UNCTAD Ukraine Peer Review], available at www.unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary 
/ditcclp2013d3_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/2E8A-WD8S]; UNCTAD, Voluntary Peer Review of 
Competition Law and Policy: Pakistan (June 6, 2013), available at www.unctad.org/en/Publications 
Library/ditcclp201.3d4_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/NK7Q-556X ]; UNCTAD, Voluntary Peer Review of 
Competition Policy: Armenia (Aug. 31, 2010), available at www.unctad.org/en/docs/ditcclp20101_en.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/E23U-3J6P]. Kovacic presently is participating in an OECD project to examine 
Ukraine’s implementation of recommendations contained in the UNCTAD peer review and an earlier 
OECD peer review of Ukraine’s competition law system. OECD, Peer Review of Ukraine’s 
Antimonopoly System (2008), available at www.oecd.org [https://perma.cc/YJJ2-4SSM]. 
 42. Since 2011, at least one of the authors has visited the competition authorities of the following 
jurisdictions that adopted competition laws from 1990 onward: Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Barbados, 
Botswana, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, the Czech Republic, Ecuador, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, 
Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Kenya, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, 
Netherlands, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Serbia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Taiwan, Thailand, 
Turkey, Ukraine, and Zambia. 
 43.  On the hazards in relying on first-person narratives to understand the actions and motives of a 
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or former agency officials sometimes portray events in a way that flatters their 
contributions to public service;44 practitioners occasionally grind axes to express 
unhappiness arising from an adverse result in a matter before a competition 
authority;45 and academics periodically scold agencies for not embracing their 
policy recommendations.46 To correct for these difficulties the authors have 
sought to interview as many individuals as possible and to verify subjective 
assessments by reference to observable facts. 
The collection and interpretation of this information is deeply influenced by 
the interdisciplinary orientation of Duke University’s Kenan Institute for Ethics’ 
Rethinking Regulation Initiative.47 The legal system analysis is enriched by 
insights derived from several bodies of learning that the Rethinking Regulation 
Initiative seeks to unite: economics, history, law, political science, and public 
administration.48 For competition law or otherwise, the establishment of a 
successful regulatory regime requires an awareness of the economic and political 
conditions that facilitate or hinder policy implementation, an understanding of 
the incentive structures that motivate agency leadership and staff, and reflection 
upon perspectives derived from actual experience.49 Simply drafting legal 
commands and procedural mechanisms without these pillars begs failure.50 
 
competition agency, see William E. Kovacic, Antitrust Stories, 4 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 241 (2008) 
(reviewing ANTITRUST STORIES (Eleanor M. Fox & Daniel A. Crane eds., 2007)). 
 44.  See Kovacic, Partisanship, supra note 37, at 697–98 (describing how current and former antitrust 
officials sometimes depict events in a manner that magnifies their accomplishments).  
 45.  In our experience competition law practitioners tend either to criticize competition agencies for 
not being active enough, or, when the agency is active and moves against one of their clients, for reaching 
an infringement decision. 
 46.  Kovacic spent fifteen years in academia before returning to the Federal Trade Commission to 
serve in senior management positions. The experience drove home how poorly academics understand 
the size of the gap between the theory of public policy and its practice. 
 47.  See Rethinking Regulation, THE KENAN INSTITUTE FOR ETHICS AT DUKE UNIVERSITY, 
www.kenan.ethics.duke.edu/regulation/about/rethinking-regulation [https://perma.cc/E6J9-3XHV] (last 
visited May 29, 2016) (outlining the Rethinking Regulation Initiative and its goals). 
 48.  Id. See also David Deller & Francesca Vantaggiato, Revisiting the Regulatory State: A 
Multidisciplinary Review Establishing a New Research Agenda (Centre for Competition Policy, 
University of East Anglia, 2014) (discussing value of multidisciplinary perspective in analyzing regulatory 
agency design and performance).  
 49.  On the importance of a careful examination of existing economic and political conditions and 
institutional arrangements as a foundation for regulatory reform, see William E. Kovacic, Designing and 
Implementing Competition and Consumer Protection Reforms in Transitional Economies: Perspectives 
from Mongolia, Nepal, Ukraine, and Zimbabwe, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1197, 1215–23 (1995) [hereinafter 
Perspectives]. See also MICHAL S. GAL, COMPETITION POLICY FOR SMALL MARKET ECONOMIES 4 
(2003) (discussing special considerations in devising competition policy in small markets; observing that 
“Small economies need a competition policy that is specifically tailored to their markets.”); Oliver 
Budzinski & Maryam H.A. Beigi, Generating Instead of Protecting Competition, in THE ECONOMIC 
CHARACTERISTICS OF DEVELOPING JURISDICTIONS: THE IMPLICATIONS FOR COMPETITION LAW 224, 
229 (Michal S. Gal et al., eds., 2015) (“Competition policy is not an isolated concept; it needs to be 
effective with respect to the context of the society where it is implemented”). 
 50.  The habit of Western advisors of giving transition economies off-the-rack regulatory solutions 
devised in well-established market economies, and to slight implementation issues, is criticized in William 
E. Kovacic, The Competition Policy Entrepreneur and Law Reform in Formerly Communist and Socialist 
Countries, 11 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 437, 437–39, 445–51 (1996) [hereinafter Entrepreneur].  
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III 
POLICY IMPLEMENTATION: TASKS, CHALLENGES, AND REALISTIC 
EXPECTATIONS 
Evaluating competition law regimes raises a dual inquiry: not only how but 
also when to determine whether a new competition law system is working 
effectively. The first part of the question requires at least a preliminary inquiry 
into what constitutes good performance by a regulatory agency and, ideally, how 
much an agency has contributed to improvements in economic performance. 
Because performance is difficult to measure, elected officials, journalists, 
practitioners, regulators, and academic researchers often use activity-related 
proxies.51 Perhaps the most common performance metric used in popular and 
scholarly discussions of regulatory agency behavior, and certainly the behavior 
of competition agencies, is the amount of activity in the form of investigations 
launched, cases prosecuted, fines imposed, and rules promulgated.52 Many 
competition agency officials begin speeches by saying that their organizations 
have been “busy,” a statement based on the premise that high levels of activity 
certify quality in an agency.53 
Yet activity levels are dreadfully ambiguous indicators of agency 
performance.54 To be sure, activity is hardly irrelevant to a sound assessment of 
 
 51.  On the popularity of activity-based measures of competition agency performance, see William 
E. Kovacic, Creating a Respected Brand: How Regulatory Agencies Signal Quality, 22 GEO. MASON L. 
REV. 237, 246–47 (2015) [hereinafter Respected Brand]; William E. Kovacic, Rating the Competition 
Agencies: What Constitutes Good Performance?, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 903, 908 (2009) [hereinafter 
Rating the Competition Agencies]; William E. Kovacic, The Modern Evolution of U.S. Competition Policy 
Enforcement Norms, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 377, 404–05 (2003) [hereinafter Enforcement Norms]. There is 
a healthy and growing effort, by agencies and scholars, to develop and apply techniques for answering 
the fundamental question of economic impact. This is evident, among other places, in the programs of 
the OECD’s Competition Committee, which has held several roundtables on the evaluation of 
competition agency effectiveness. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 52.  See, e.g., Rating Enforcement 2015: The Annual Ranking of the World’s Top Antitrust 
Authorities, GLOB. COMPETITION REV. 1, 2–32 (2015) (presenting evaluation criteria, which gives the 
heaviest weight to activity levels, including cases prosecuted); James C. Cooper & William E. Kovacic, 
Behavioral Economics and Its Meaning for Antitrust Agency Decision Making, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 779, 
783–84 (2012) (describing forces that create pressure for regulators to maximize “observable action”); 
William E. Kovacic et al., How Does Your Competition Agency Measure Up?, 7 EUR. COMPETITION L.J. 
25, 27–30, 37–39 (2011) [hereinafter Measure Up] (discussing popularity of activity-based measures of 
competition agency effectiveness). 
 53.  See Kovacic et al., Measure Up, supra note 52, at 27–28 (noting this tendency); see also Renata 
B. Hesse, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
Remarks at the Global Competition Review Live 5th Annual Antitrust Law Leaders Forum 1 (Miami, FL., 
Feb. 5, 2016), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/principal-deputy-assistant-attorney-
general-renata-b-hesse-delivers-remarks-global (“2015 was a busy year for the division – we opened a 
number of investigations, logged a lot of trial time, and recorded several victories of note”); Sharis Pozen, 
Acting Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Developments at the 
Antitrust Division & The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines – One Year Later 1 (Washington, D.C., Nov. 
17, 2011), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/acting-assistant-attorney-general-sharis-pozen-
speaks-american-bar-association-2011 (“[I]t has been a busy and exciting time to be at the division.”).  
 54.  See  Svetlana Ardasheva et al., Distorting effects of competition authority’s measurement: the case 
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agency performance.55 An agency that does nothing to apply its powers properly 
can be regarded as a failure.56 For example, at least some level of law enforcement 
is necessary to deter infringements, to build and sustain agency capacity, and to 
establish the institution’s legitimacy, in a broad political and social sense.57 After 
all, why should legislators entrust public funds to an agency that mothballs its 
powers? But a single-minded focus on activity (the output) cannot automatically 
be equated with accomplishment (the outcome). Doing a lot of things is not the 
same as doing the right things, or doing them the right way. 
Activity-centrism also creates warped incentives for senior leaders, who may 
focus on the acclaim and headlines that accompany new initiatives but ignore the 
long-term costs to the agency and the public when  improvidently conceived (but 
flashy) matters later implode.58 Leaders who succumb to the sirens of activity also 
are likely to underinvest in long-term assets, failing to develop and cultivate 
knowledge, procedures, administrative infrastructure, and staff capacity that 
would increase the agency’s potential for future success.59 
In the first decades of a new competition agency, resources should be 
allocated primarily to the enhancement of institutional foundations and agency 
capability, and secondarily to the exercise of law enforcement or rulemaking 
powers.60 The key institutional foundations include: processes for defining goals, 
choosing a strategy to realize the agency’s objectives, selecting projects, and 
testing evidence rigorously; regular investments in knowledge; the disclosure of 
enforcement intentions and analytical methods; and routine evaluation.61 As 
capability increases, the agency can pursue a more ambitious program.62 This 
 
of Russia, 29 INT’L J. PUBLIC SECTOR MGMT 288 (2016) (documenting adverse incentive effects of 
measuring competition agency performance by counting the number of tasks completed); Kovacic, 
Rating the Competition Agencies, supra note 51, at 908 (explaining why  activity levels poorly reflect 
agency performance); Kovacic, Enforcement Norms, supra note 51, at 408–10; Kovacic et al., Measure 
Up, supra note 52, at 37–39. 
 55.  See Kovacic, Respected Brand, supra note 51, at 247–48 (describing importance to an agency’s 
credibility of sustaining a basic level of activity). 
 56.  See id. (describing how non-enforcement of a legal command can deny an agency “an important 
measure of political and reputational capital”). At the same time, however, an antitrust agency’s 
reputation may improve if it declines to enforce a legal command that has come to be widely regarded as 
ill-conceived and hostile to consumer interests. See Kovacic, Enforcement Norms, supra note 51, at 410–
15 (describing retreat of Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission since early 1970s from 
enforcement of the Robinson-Patman Act); Daniel Sokol, Analyzing Robinson-Patman, 83 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 2064, 2066-67 (2015). 
 57.  See Kovacic, Respected Brand, supra note 51, at 247–48. 
 58.  See William E. Kovacic & David A. Hyman, Consume or Invest: What Do/Should Agency 
Leaders Maximize?, 91 WASH. L. REV. 295, 317–20 (2016) [hereinafter Consume or Invest] (analyzing 
this phenomenon).  
 59.  See id. at 304–13 (discussing how excessive emphasis on launching new cases or rulemaking 
proceedings can cause underinvestment in building capacity needed to carry out such measures 
successfully). 
 60.  See infra Part IV.C (discussing the need to match program commitments to institutional 
capabilities, especially early on in an agency’s lifetime). 
 61.  See Kovacic et al., Measure Up, supra note 52, at 30–33 (setting out institutional predicates for 
success). 
 62.  See id. 
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article assumes that improvements in capability—notably, increases in the 
agency’s human capital, the augmentation of its base of knowledge, and mastery 
of the evidence-gathering methods and analytical techniques that are integral to 
the development of successful cases and other policy measures—tend over time 
to increase the frequency with which the agency’s work improves social welfare. 
Mexico’s competition system illustrates the virtues of sustained incremental 
improvement. Mexico’s competition agency is a success story, but it was not an 
overnight wonder. The agency did not mount a major assault on the dominant 
position of Telmex, the largest provider of telecommunications services in 
Mexico, and its politically powerful leader, Carlos Slim, until well into the second 
decade of its operations.63 Though the Telmex matter—which focused on conduct 
alleged to be an abuse of a dominant market position—did not accomplish all of 
its goals, the properly timed action catalyzed significant improvements in the 
country’s telecommunications sector.64 
A second issue is to determine the right time to assess effectiveness. It is 
possible to form tentative views in the earliest stages of a new regime.65 For both 
domestic participants and external observers, it is sensible to monitor progress of 
a new system from its early days and use regular assessments as tools to improve 
programs or institutional arrangements.66 Early focal points for evaluation 
include success in hiring skilled professionals and administrative personnel, 
building public awareness of the competition law regime, issuing guidelines 
regarding the agency’s enforcement intentions, and in accelerating the processing 
of routine tasks, such as the review of merger applications under a system of 
mandatory notification.67 A habit of assessing the results of individual matters 
and measuring progress in building an effective administrative infrastructure 
facilitates learning and shows the way to improvements that strengthen the 
competition system.68 This process also supplies the basis for an agency to seek 
“upgrades” to its powers, structure, and resources to remedy imperfections that 
become apparent in the course of operating the agency.69 
 
 63.  William E. Kovacic, Interview with Eduardo Perez Motta, Former President of the CFC 
(Mexico’s competition commission) in Washington, D.C. (Apr. 7, 2016); Umut Aydin, Competition Law 
and Policy in Mexico: Successes and Challenges, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2016 at 170–71. 
 64.  Interview with Eduardo Perez Motta, supra note 63. The Mexican competition authority’s 
initiative appears to have helped trigger a major upgrading of the powers of Mexico’s 
telecommunications regulator and motivated closer scrutiny of Telmex going forward. Id. 
 65.  Kovacic, Institutional Foundations, supra note 1, at 313–14 (describing importance of early and 
continuing efforts to evaluate progress toward building effective competition law institutions). 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Kovacic, Getting Started, supra note 20, at 446–52. 
 68.  Kovacic, FTC at 100, supra note 35, at 4–6 (habit of self-assessment serves to increase capacity 
and improve performance).  
 69.  A characteristic of successful competition systems, both old and new, is that they periodically 
receive enhancements in powers, structure, and resources. This has been the case for newer systems such 
as South Africa, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico. See Dennis Davis, The South African Competition Experience: 
A Review of Fifteen Years into a New Regime, in ANTITRUST IN EMERGING AND DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 159 (Eleanor M. Fox et al., eds., 2015) (reviewing experience in South Africa); Andre 
Gilberto, Competition Law Enforcement in Brazil: How CADE Is Overcoming Deep Structural Problems 
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One can, and should, assess progress continuously throughout the 
development of the new regime. Competition officials are increasingly aware that 
this type of routine assessment is a core element of good management: regular 
assessment of performance facilitates the process of learning and improvement 
by which institutions become more effective.70 At the same time, one should keep 
in mind that it can take twenty to twenty-five years to form a reliable impression 
of whether the new system truly has taken root and is able to realize sustained 
implementation success. Views formed in the earliest stages of a competition 
regime can be misleading.71 For most jurisdictions it takes at least this long to 
construct and set the system’s institutional footings, which include adopting and 
refining the initial statutory scheme, obtaining judicial interpretations of the law’s 
substantive commands and procedural features, building capacity within the 
competition agency, and improving the supporting institutions (such as 
universities) whose contributions are necessary to sustain an effective system.72 
The need to observe a new system’s development for a significant time before 
drawing strong conclusions about its ruggedness and effectiveness is apparent in 
the experience of Latin America’s competition systems through the mid-1990s. 
Within five years of its creation, Peru’s competition agency INDECOPI73 had 
gained a superior reputation within Latin America and globally, largely through 
the work of Beatriz Boza, the agency’s first chair, and the exceptional 
professionals she recruited to fill senior management posts.74 The launch of new 
competition systems in Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela was no less impressive. 
Astute leaders headed each of these systems (Jorge Bogo in Argentina, Gesner 
Oliveira in Brazil, and Ana Julia Jatar in Venezuela) and attracted bright, young 
men and women to join them.75 The early success these systems enjoyed in  
 
 
to Become an Internationally Recognized Agency, in ANTITRUST IN EMERGING AND DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 11 (Eleanor M. Fox et al. eds., 2015) (analyzing Brazil); Francisco Agüero, Chilean Antitrust 
Policy: Some Lessons Behind Its Success, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2016, at 152–54 (discussing 
the Chilean case); Aydin, supra note 63, at 182 (discussing development of Mexico’s system).  
 70.  On May 16, 2016, Kovacic chaired a roundtable of competition agency enforcers a conference 
in Mexico City at the Competition Midyear Meeting of the International Bar Association. The panelists 
included Esteban Grecco, the head of Argentina’s competition agency; Eduardo Frade, a member of the 
board of CADE, Brazil’s competition authority; and Alejandra Palacios, the president of Mexico’s 
competition agency. All emphasized the value of developing and applying performance metrics to assess 
the quality of their internal procedures. 
 71.  See infra notes 73–81and accompanying text. 
 72.  See generally Kovacic, Institutional Foundations, supra note 3 (expanding on how competition 
systems grow and evolve and that it is necessary to give these institutions proper time to mature before 
assessing their success).  
 73.  See generally LESSONS FROM THE FIRST YEARS OF INDECOPI: PERU’S EXPERIENCE IN 
MARKET REGULATORY REFORM 1993–1998 (Beatriz Boza ed,. 1998) (discussing the formation and 
early years of INDECOPI). 
 74.  Interview with Luis Canseco-Diaz, Former Judge with Peru’s Intellectual Property Court, in 
Lima, Peru (Aug. 21, 2016). 
 75.  Kovacic observed the development of these institutions in the course of several visits to these 
countries in the 1990s and in conversations with the three officials at various international events in that 
decade. 
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building exceptional teams of professionals and articulating a vision of policy 
implementation appeared to set a foundation for even better days to come.76 
Experience over the past two decades has confounded some of the elevated 
expectations of the mid-1990s. Of the three jurisdictions that had ascended 
quickly, only Brazil’s competition system today retains the full luster of its early 
days.77 At the same time, the performance of Latin American systems that 
seemed less promising in the mid-1990s has improved steadily.78 For example, the 
competition law regimes in Chile and Mexico developed slowly. Beginning in the 
1990s, each system gradually enhanced the quality of its professional staff, 
obtained improvements in their statutory mandates, and undertook progressively 
more ambitious enforcement programs.79 Chile and Mexico now stand with Brazil 
as cases of largely successful policy implementation.80 Colombia’s competition 
regime, begun over a half-century ago, has also made notable progress in recent 
years.81 
However, these examples provide no assurance that an agency that emerges 
from its first decades in good condition is guaranteed to remain successful. 
Beyond this period, older and newer agencies alike face challenges that can 
determine whether they will sustain better performance or if they will suffer 
lasting damage. Poland’s experience indicates why a period of twenty to twenty-
five years of experience arguably is necessary to assess a regime’s resilience. The 
establishment of a competition policy system in Poland in the early 1990s was a 
crucial event in the formerly communist states of central and Eastern Europe.82 
Poland was an early and continuing barometer for measuring the success of 
competition law reforms among the suddenly large and expanding cohort of 
transition economies.83 As a result of Poland’s strong commitment to the 
 
 76.  Interview with Marcelo Calliari, Former Member of CADE, in London, United Kingdom (June 
27, 2016). 
 77.  See ANTITRUST IN EMERGING AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 69 for an 
informative treatment of developments in Latin America since the mid-1990s. See also ORG. FOR ECON. 
COOPERATION & DEV., COMPETITION AND MARKET STUDIES IN LATIN AMERICA (2015); ORG. FOR 
ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., FOLLOW-UP TO NINE PEER REVIEWS OF COMPETITION LAW AND 
POLICY OF LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES: ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, CHILE, COLOMBIA, EL SALVADOR, 
HONDURAS, MEXICO, PANAMA AND PERU (2012); COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY IN LATIN 
AMERICA (Eleanor M. Fox & D. Daniel Sokol eds., 2009); Claudia Schatan, The Dynamics of 
Competition Policies in Small Developing Economies: the Central American Countries’ Experience, in  
NEW COMPETITION JURISDICTIONS 91 (Richard Whish & Christopher Townley eds., 2012).  
 78.  See infra notes 79–81 and accompanying text. 
 79.  Interview with Julian Pena, Partner, Allende & Brea, Buenos Aries (Nov. 20, 2015). 
 80.  See Aydin, supra note 63 (detailing Mexico’s progression).  
 81.  See GLOB. COMPETITION REV., THE ANTITRUST REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS 2016, 
http://globalcompetitionreview.com/reviews/74/antitrust-review-americas-2016 [https://perma.cc/ACQ8-
PGPH] (recounting the modern progress of Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico).  
 82.  See generally JOHN FINGLETON ET AL., COMPETITION POLICY AND THE TRANSFORMATION 
OF CENTRAL EUROPE (1996) (describing early development of competition law in the Visegrad nations, 
including Poland). 
 83.  See generally Russell Pittman, Competition Law in Central and Eastern Europe: Five Years Later, 
43 ANTITRUST BULL. 179 (1998) (highlighting Poland as one of the first countries to adopt competition 
laws in the aftermath of the Soviet Union breakup). 
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endeavor as well as substantial, prolonged support from the European Union and 
United States competition regimes, the Polish Office of Competition and 
Consumer Protection became a formidable and well-respected institution.84 The 
twentieth birthday of the Polish competition system in 2012 occasioned an 
international celebration of the country’s accomplishments, as evidenced by the 
creation of a capable team of professionals, the gradual development of effective 
advocacy and law enforcement programs, and its leadership for new agencies in 
Central and Eastern Europe.85 In April 2013, the Office hosted the International 
Competition Network’s Annual Conference, the largest annual gathering of the 
world’s competition agencies.86 
The past three years have provided jarring reminders that Poland and other 
competition agencies can take nothing for granted. In 2014, the head of state 
dismissed the Polish Office of Competition and Consumer Protection’s well-
regarded chair, Malgorzata Krasnodebska-Tomkiel, over a policy 
disagreement.87 Her successor, Adam Jassar, preserved key ingredients of his 
predecessor’s program, and added new and useful enhancements; he quickly 
dispelled fears that Tomkiel’s ouster foreshadowed a new and unwelcome period 
of intrusive political interference in the Office’s operations.88 But in December 
2015, new political leadership announced its intent to dismiss Jassar as soon as 
his replacement could be arranged.89 
Even in the best of circumstances, leadership changes in regulatory agencies 
can be a source of considerable anxiety for businesses and the agency’s own 
staff.90 It is still more unsettling when the political intervention causes the 
 
 84.  See generally Michael Wise, Review of Competition Law and Policy in Poland, 5 OECD J. OF 
COMPETITION L. & POL’Y 83 (2003) (discussing the development of competition law in Poland and its 
role in helping to reshape the Polish economy).  
 85.  See CHANGES IN COMPETITION LAW OVER THE PAST TWO DECADES (Malgorzata 
Krasnodebska-Tomkiel ed., 2010) (commemorating the twentieth anniversary of the creation of Poland’s 
competition law system). 
 86.  ICN 12th Annual Conference, ICN, www.icnwarsaw2013.org [https://perma.cc/2U3W-ETJY]. 
 87.  Interview with Malgorzata Krasnodebska-Tomkiel, Former President of Poland’s UOKIK, 
Warsaw, Poland (Oct. 12, 2015); Faaez Samedi, Poland sacks authority head, GLOB. COMPETITION REV. 
(Feb. 10, 2014), http://globalcompetitionreview.com/news/article/35210/poland-sacks-authority-head/ 
[https://perma.cc/5KW4-XLLD] (reporting dismissal of Malgorzata Krasnodebska-Tomkiel as head of 
Poland’s Office of Competition and Consumer Protection). 
 88.  Interview with Malgorzata Krasnodebska-Tomkiel, Former President of Poland’s UOKIK, 
Warsaw, Poland (Oct. 12, 2015); Interview with Adam Jasser, President of Poland’s UOKIK, Warsaw, 
Poland (Oct. 13, 2015); Katy Oglethorpe, Government advisor to head Polish Authority, GLOB. 
COMPETITION REV. (Mar. 19, 2014), available at http://globalcompetitionreview.com/news/article/ 
35535/government-advisor-to-head-polish-authority/ [https://perma.cc/W9B3-C4NV] (reporting 
appointment of Adam Jasser to lead Poland’s Office of Competition and Consumer Protection). 
 89.  PaRR, 2016 Global Trends Monitor 21 (201/35535/6) (noting dismissal of Adam Jasser as head 
of Poland’s UOKIK in January 2016); Tom Madge-Wyld, Poland appoints new competition chief, GLOB. 
COMPETITION REV. (May 13, 2016), http://globalcompetitionreview.com /news/article/41049/poland-
appoints-new-competition-chief/ [https://perma.cc/KY97-CR5Y] (reporting appointment of Marck 
Niechcial to replace Adam Jasser as head of Poland’s Office of Competition and Consumer Protection).  
 90.  See generally Kovacic, Partisanship, supra note 37 (describing influence of politics and 
partisanship on U.S. antitrust policymaking). 
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removal of top management. To undergo multiple politically inspired dismissals 
in only a few years would be an immense shock for any agency. The disorienting 
effect on the agency itself, with the uncertainty about future programs and the 
inevitable shuffling of personnel in the front office and other management 
positions, should not be underestimated. External observers would be hardly less 
distressed as they wonder about how and when elected officials would intervene 
again in the agency’s work. Some agencies have demonstrated the resilience to 
bounce back from seemingly abrupt and unanticipated leadership changes that 
in some sense were related to a policy clash between the agency’s head and the 
country’s political leadership.91 The concern is that such transitions can 
undermine the agency’s performance, at least in the short term, and cause serious 
reputational damage over the longer term. It takes a long time to climb a tall 
mountain; the descent from a misstep generally is much faster. 
For the most part, an older, better-established, and more experienced agency 
is more likely to be in a stronger position to respond to such blows and recover. 
This is because: (a) a better-established and more experienced agency has had 
more time to build a career staff that provides continuity and stability over time 
and is able to carry out the work of the agency despite significant disruptions in 
leadership;92 and (b) such an agency probably has accumulated reputational 
capital that it can “spend” in the time of a crisis to maintain its standing in the 
eyes of external audiences.93 A relatively newer agency, by contrast, may be more 
vulnerable to being swept aside or permanently diminished because it has not 
had the opportunity to build a staff of sufficient depth and experience or to build 
a reputation that can sustain it in difficult times. 
 
 91.  Consider two examples. Beatriz Boza, the first head of Peru’s INDECOPI, left her agency after 
the political upheaval surrounding the departure of Alberto Fugimori, the country’s president. Fugimori 
had brought Boza back to Peru to lead INDECOPI, and his ouster as president led her to leave 
INDECOPI. Interview with Beatriz Boza, Former President of INDECOPI, Lima, Peru (Dec. 7, 2011). 
In the decade or so after Boza left office, INDECOPI underwent significant policy adjustments under 
new leadership. In recent years, the agency appears to have made progress in improving its programs and 
stature under the leadership of Hebert Tassano. Interview with Luis Canseco-Diez, Founder, 
DiezCanseco, Lima, Peru (Aug. 21, 2016). The second example is the Israel Antitrust Authority. Earlier 
this year, the agency’s president, David Gilo announced his resignation after the country’s president 
decided to override the antitrust agency’s opposition to a merger of two natural gas companies. Sharon 
Udasin, Antitrust Commissioner David Gilo to resign in August amid gas disputes, THE JERUSALEM POST 
(May 25, 2015), http://www.jpost.com/Business-and-Innovation/Antitrust-Commissioner-David-Gilo-to-
resign-in-August-amid-gas-disputes-404017. The resignation raised questions about the future stability 
of Israel’s antitrust regime. These concerns have been allayed by the appointment of a highly respected 
practitioner, Michal Halperin, who previously had worked at the Israel Antitrust Authority. Ora Coren, 
Prominent Lawyer Michal Halperin Named Israel’s New Antitrust Chief, Haaretz (Jan. 27, 2016), 
http://www.haaretz.com/Israel-news/business/premium-1.699928 [https://perma.cc/KY97-CR5Y]. All 
indications suggest that the leadership transition has proceeded smoothly, and the work of the agency 
has not been adversely affected. Interview with David Gilo, Former Chairman of the Antitrust Authority 
of Israel, Rhodes, Greece (July 4, 2016). 
 92.   See Kovacic, Partisanship, supra note 37, at 704 (discussing resilience of a long-standing 
professional staff). 
 93.  See William E. Kovacic & Marc Winerman, The Federal Trade Commission as an Independent 
Agency: Autonomy, Legitimacy, and Effectiveness, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2085, 2106–07 (2015) (discussing 
how competition agencies accumulate and spend political capital). 
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 A. Testing The Agency’s Powers 
All new competition agencies must work through an initial period where they 
apply their powers for the first time. Inevitably, there will be a lag (sometimes 
substantial) between the new competition law’s effective date and when its 
implementing agency becomes proficient in performing basic tasks associated 
with carrying out investigations, gathering evidence, formulating theories of 
liability, and prosecuting cases.94 It is one thing to sit in a training seminar to hear 
an expert review the analytical foundations of competition law and explain the 
conceptual ingredients of something like offenses based on single-firm 
misconduct. It is entirely another to identify a potential target for prosecution, 
prepare a case, and carry it through a series of judicial appeals. 
There is nothing automatic or easy about the launch of a new system and the 
learning process that is vital to a successful program. Three basic examples 
illustrate the difficulties a new agency confronts in carrying out essential tasks 
associated with law enforcement. A necessary first step for a competition agency 
is to define its objectives and choose a strategy to achieve its aims.95 Legislators 
often seek to achieve a wide range of objectives in passing a competition law.96 
The competition agency is left in the difficult position of reconciling the varied—
and sometimes contradictory—policy aims and formulating a coherent 
program.97 
The second task is more prosaic but no less important: mastering the use of 
search warrants or related tools that authorize agencies to collect information or 
conduct unannounced inspections of business premises and collect evidence.98 
For an agency that has never done one, the dawn raid can be a complex, 
bewildering process. A properly executed dawn raid that yields information 
useful in preparing a case requires preparing a specific description of the 
 
 94.   Many senior officials from new competition agencies confirmed for us that none of this is easy 
for an agency starting from scratch. Interview with Dragen Penezic, Secretary General, Serbian 
Competition Commission, Belgrade, Serbia (April 7, 2016); Interview with Skaidrite Abrama, President, 
Latvian Competition Commission, Riga, Latvia (May 8, 2015); Interview with Sarunas Keraskouskas, 
Chairman, Lithuanian Competition Commission, Vilnius, Lithuania (September 10, 2015); Interview 
with Anna Fornalczyk, Former President, Competition and Consumer Protection Agency of Poland, 
Warsaw, Poland (Oct. 13, 2015). 
 95.  See William E. Kovacic, The Digital Broadband Migration and the Federal Trade Commission: 
Building the Competition and Consumer Protection Agency of the Future, 8 J. TELECOM. & HIGH TECH. 
L. 1, 8–9 (2010) (discussing importance of definition of goals and choice of strategy as determinants of 
agency effectiveness).  
 96.  See David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic, Institutional Design, Agency Life Cycle, and the 
Goals of Competition Law, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2163, 2165–69 (2013) (discussing how legislatures seek 
to realize multiple policy goals by enacting competition laws). See also DAVID LEWIS, ENFORCING 
COMPETITION RULES IN SOUTH AFRICA: THIEVES AT THE DINNER TABLE 111–12, 117–28 (2015) 
(describing public interest objectives of South Africa’s competition law). 
 97.  See Winerman & Kovacic, Outpost Years, supra note 35, at 149–57 (recounting struggles of early 
FTC to resolve tensions among competing legislative visions of what the agency should accomplish). 
 98.  On the use of these evidence gathering techniques in cartel investigations, see INT’L 
COMPETITION NETWORK, ANTI-CARTEL ENFORCEMENT MANUAL 1–47 (May 2009), http://www. 
internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc340.pdf [https://perma.cc/74K2-U994].  
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materials to be collected, correctly identifying the premises to be searched, 
assembling a team of inspectors with a clear idea of what items to seize and what 
information to collect (such as passwords for computer systems), a sound 
methodology for making an inventory of items taken, an expert in the law 
governing searches who can deal with on-site objections raised by business 
managers, and, once evidence is collected, a team of forensic specialists who can 
analyze and distill the relevant evidence.99 This is further complicated if an agency 
must search multiple premises, where the agency must synchronize the timing of 
entry to avoid alerting some office managers of the raid’s imminence and thus 
giving them an opportunity to conceal or destroy responsive records.100 
For a novice agency (and for a few experienced agencies), drafting and 
executing a search warrant are tasks fraught with opportunities for error. Most 
competition agencies can recount stories about arriving at the business offices 
only to discover that the search warrant (usually approved by a magistrate or 
other judicial officer) listed the wrong address for the premises to be inspected, 
thus rendering the search instrument invalid.101 In other cases, the difficulties go 
beyond occasions for simple institutional embarrassment. In some jurisdictions, 
the competition agency faces a serious possibility that its employees will 
encounter a violent response when they arrive to carry out the dawn raid.102 In 
other countries, the danger of terrorist bombings effectively precludes the 
competition agency from conducting compulsory searches or even visiting 
business premises for voluntary interviews.103 
A third example involves applying merger control mechanisms that require 
advance notification of certain transactions and impose a suspensory period in 
which the parties are barred from closing their deal. Roughly seventy 
 
 99.  Id. (discussing performance of these tasks). 
 100.  Id. at 15 (“It is a good practice to make entry simultaneously with search teams on other 
premises and equip each Team Leader with a mobile phone and the numbers of a central command post 
and/or all other relevant team leaders in order to enable continuous coordination.”). 
 101.  The first dawn raid carried out by Portugal’s competition authority is illustrative. When the 
agency’s officials came to the premises of the business enterprise to be examined, they discovered that 
the firm’s headquarters had moved across the street. Thus, the search warrant listed an address different 
from the firm’s current address. The search instrument, as signed by the magistrate, did not authorize the 
agency to search the new headquarters facility. The Portuguese authority obtained a new warrant, this 
time with the correct address, and executed the search some days later. The search was unproductive, 
perhaps because the target enterprise used the interim to move potentially troublesome records to a new 
location, or to sweep computers for electronic records. Interview with Mariana Taveras, Former Chief of 
Staff to the President of Portugal’s Competition Agency, London, United Kingdom (Jan. 28, 2016). 
 102.  In visits to Russia in the 1990s, Kovacic heard on a number of occasions from officials in the 
Federal Antimonopoly Service that some sectors were controlled by mafia-like organizations that would 
not hesitate to gun down a government official seeking to present a search warrant. See William E. 
Kovacic, The Competition Policy Entrepreneur and Law Reform in Formerly Communist and Socialist 
Countries, 11 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 437, 444–45 (1996) (discussing concerns expressed by employees of 
the regional offices of the Federal Antimonopoly Service).  
 103.  This is the case for the Competition Committee of Pakistan, which cannot conduct operations 
in some violence-prone regions of Pakistan. Interview with Joseph Wilson, Commissioner of the 
Competition Commission of Pakistan, Geneva, Switzerland (July 10, 2016). 
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jurisdictions have established variants of this process,.104 and all have 
underestimated the administrative burdens it entails.  The United States created 
the prototype for this form of merger control with the Hart-Scott-Rodino 
Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976.105 The statute’s implementing regulation 
took effect in January 1979, and the first years of its operation were marked by 
the U.S. antitrust agencies’ often chaotic efforts—with great resources at their 
disposal and long experience with merger analysis—to build internal procedures 
to evaluate large bodies information in a relatively short time and to prepare 
cases for litigation challenging potentially anti-competitive transactions.106 
Nearly every jurisdiction that has traveled this path has found that it takes 
considerable time and resources to build capable teams of case handlers to review 
proposed transactions, to devise administrative procedures for organizing and 
evaluating large amounts of information, to find ways to give informative 
disclosure and advice to business planners, and to capture and retain knowledge 
gained from practice.107 
The experience with merger review points to the vital role of learning in the 
development of a competition agency and, more generally, a competition system. 
The search for effective methods of policy implementation involves an inevitable 
element of experimentation; key focal points include the establishment of 
processes to identify promising subjects for investigation, selecting strong cases, 
and successfully prosecuting infringements.108 With experimentation comes a mix 
of success and failure. There is no shame in failure—only in making a habit of it, 
 
 104.  GETTING THE DEAL THROUGH: MERGER CONTROL 2016, at 450–79 (John Davies ed., 2016). 
 105.  15 U.S.C. § 18a (2000). See generally William Blumenthal, Twenty Years of Hart-Scott-Rodino 
Merger Enforcement, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 813 (1997) (detailing the origins and effects of the Hart-Scott-
Rodino merger control reforms). 
 106.  See William E. Kovacic, HSR at 35: the Early US Premerger Notification Experience and its 
Meaning for New Systems of Competition Law, in NEW COMPETITION JURISDICTIONS 9 (Richard Whish 
& Christopher Townley eds., 2012) [hereinafter HSR at 35] (highlighting the early difficulties of the FTC 
in implementing a new program of compulsory advance notification of mergers). 
 107. China provides an informative illustration. In creating its competition law system, China greatly 
underestimated the administrative difficulties that its premerger notification system would present. 
Twenty people were assigned to the new merger review unit of the Ministry of Commerce—ten 
professionals and ten administrative support staff. The badly understaffed bureau has struggled to cope 
with the volume of mandatory filings, though staffing increases (the office now numbers approximately 
40) and the adoption of a fast-track mechanism for benign transactions has put the office in a better 
position to manage the program. See William E. Kovacic, China’s Competition Law Experience in 
Context, 3 J. OF ANTITRUST ENF’T SUPP. 1, 2 (2015) (discussing early implementation of China’s 
Antimonopoly Law and its merger review mechanism). A similar pattern has emerged in the Philippines, 
whose new competition law took effect in May 2016. The law includes a mandatory merger notification 
system, which requires merging parties to report proposed transactions in advance and allow the 
competition agency an opportunity to review the transaction before it closes. From the effective date of 
the law, the new agency’s small professional staff was swamped with merger filings. The first months of 
the agency’s operations have been dominated by a struggle to review transactions submitted under the 
mandatory notification system. Interview with El Cid Butuyan, Commissioner, Philippines Competition 
Commission, Lima, Peru (Aug. 21, 2016).  
 108.  See generally William E. Kovacic, Using Ex Post Evaluation to Improve the Performance of 
Competition Authorities, 31 J. CORP. L. 503 (2006) (examining the experimental nature of much policy 
making in competition law).  
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especially the repetition of past missteps. Successful agencies progress because 
they learn: they improve through a three-step process of experimentation, 
evaluation, and refinement.109 
Thus, one of the most important attributes of successful competition systems 
is the establishment of a culture within the competition agency that promotes 
continuing critical self-assessment and a commitment to doing better in the 
future. The development of what today are seen generally as valuable 
enforcement techniques—for example, the use of leniency mechanisms to detect 
and deter cartels110—did not occur instantaneously or with immediate success.111 
The U.S. system of mandatory premerger notification, discussed above, changed 
dramatically from its inception in 1979 to the present as the U.S. antitrust 
agencies adjusted reporting requirements and expanded efforts to make the 
mechanism’s operation more transparent for affected parties.112 The lesson from 
these and other experiences is that a competition agency rarely gets things right 
from day one. The real measure of an agency is not where it begins, but how it 
learns and progresses. 
B. Recruiting And Retaining a Capable Staff 
It can take a number of years to see whether an agency has established a 
reputation that enables it to attract and retain good attorneys, economists, and 
administrative professionals.113 Some agencies never succeed in recruiting 
sufficient numbers of capable staff. Others do well in the early years when 
enthusiasm for a new program, ambitious enforcement measures, and 
charismatic leadership make the agency a desirable employer. A serious test for 
such agencies is whether they can effectively become more than an executive 
M.B.A. program that identifies good talent for absorption by the private sector 
or by other public agencies. 
Some countries will find it easier than others to build the necessary critical 
mass of human capital. Consider the advantageous initial conditions in which 
 
 109.  See Kovacic, Partisanship, supra note 37, at 708. 
 110.  On the development of leniency as a powerful, widely employed method for detecting cartels, 
see ANTI-CARTEL ENFORCEMENT IN A CONTEMPORARY AGE: LENIENCY RELIGION (Caron Beaton-
Wells & Christopher Tran eds., 2015) [hereinafter LENIENCY RELIGION]. 
 111.  On the difficult and uncertain path that the Department of Justice traveled to transform an 
ineffective leniency program, begun in the 1970s, into a potent tool for cartel detection, see Ann O’Brien, 
Leadership of Leniency, in LENIENCY RELIGION, supra note 110, at ch. 2. The reforms undertaken in 
1993 and 1994 have been supplemented by a variety of enhancements (for example, the establishment of 
a marker system to encourage firms to report misconduct as quickly as possible, and the creation of 
“amnesty-plus” to spur companies to reveal additional cartels beyond the conspiracy immediately under 
investigation) that reflect learning from experience. Interview with Melvin Price, Head of the Criminal 
Enforcement Program, Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Lima, Peru (Aug. 20, 2016). 
 112.  See Kovacic, HSR at 35, supra note 106 (describing refinements to U.S. premerger notification 
system). 
 113.  See generally Kovacic, Respected Brand, supra note 51 (assessing the importance of reputation 
and branding to an agency’s performance). 
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Singapore established its Competition Commission in 2005.114 Public 
administration in Singapore features a longstanding tradition of superb public 
institutions staffed by highly qualified personnel and governed by stringent 
standards of integrity.115 The Competition Commission of Singapore began its 
operations, as new systems inevitably do, in a country with no experience in 
competition law. Nonetheless, the new agency had first-rate human capital: the 
typical profile for both senior managers and junior case handlers included a first 
university degree from Singapore and a second (or further in some cases) degree 
from an elite institution outside the country.116 To obtain the necessary expertise 
to implement competition laws, Singapore recruited senior managers and 
advisors from countries with extensive experience in competition law.117 No 
competition agency has enjoyed a better beginning in this respect, and the 
Singapore Competition Commission’s tradition of building a staff with 
exceptional professional skills continues today. 
In many other countries, creating the necessary critical mass of human capital 
is a much slower process. This is especially true in the former Soviet republics 
and in nations that turned to market-based reforms after a long period of central 
planning.118 Even in these circumstances, there are encouraging examples 
showing that it is possible to establish a capable team through a deliberate, 
gradual recruitment process. Latvia’s and Lithuania’s competition authorities are 
members of the cohort of new agencies established in the early to mid-1990s. 
Both institutions stand out for their quality of agency leadership and staff 
personnel.119 Serbia’s competition agency recently reached its tenth birthday, and 
the institution has made considerable progress in raising the professionalism of 
its staff.120 
 
 114.  See generally COMPETITION COMMISSION OF SINGAPORE, THE FIRST DECADE (2015) 
(recounting the history of the Competition Commission of Singapore).  
 115.  Our account of the development of competition law in Singapore draws heavily on numerous 
interviews that Kovacic conducted with Robert Ian McEwin since the early 2000s. A native Australian 
with a doctorate in economics and a law degree, McEwin served for several years on the staff of the 
Competition Commission of Singapore from the time of its formation. He witnessed the creation of the 
institution and has studied its development closely since. 
 116.  We base this observation on several visits (most recently, in April 2016) with the Competition 
Commission of Singapore that Kovacic conducted since the agency was formed in 2005. These visits have 
provided information about the backgrounds of the Commission’s managers and case handlers.  
 117.  Interview with Han Li Toh, Director General, Competition Commission of Singapore, London, 
United Kingdom (June 23, 2016). 
 118.  See Kovacic, Entrepreneur, supra note 50, at 451–60 (discussing limits on talent available to staff 
competition agencies in formerly planned economies); Kovacic, Institutional Foundations, supra note 1, 
at 305–06. 
 119.  We base this observation on site visits that Kovacic made to the Latvian authority in May 2015 
and December 2015 and to the Lithuanian authority in September 2015. 
 120.  Interviews with Dragen Penezic, Secretary General, Commission for Protection of Competition 
in the Republic of Serbia, Belgrade, Serbia (April 11–12, 2016). Kovacic had the opportunity to meet 
with the entire board of the Serbian authority on April 12 to discuss the agency’s development. Several 
factors have accounted for improvements in the professionalism of the Serbian authority’s professional 
staff. The agency (a) formed closer ties with academics at local universities to identify promising 
candidates for recruitment; (b) strengthened internal training programs; and (c) expanded efforts to 
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The experience of these and other agencies shows that it is possible to attain 
requisite levels of capacity, yet it also demonstrates that accumulating necessary 
skills will take considerable time in many jurisdictions. Consider why the 
jurisdictions showing progress—for example, Latvia, Lithuania, and Serbia—
have built good teams. Several ingredients are important: agency leadership that 
recognizes the importance of human capital to the institution and makes 
recruitment and retention a high priority from the start; the initiation of a 
sufficient number of law enforcement or other initiatives that showcase the 
attractions of competition law as a career and the special experience that 
employment with the competition agency can offer; the creation of links to the 
university community that draw promising students to the agency; and the 
establishment of a career development program for employees, including an 
internal academy for training in concepts and practical skills, and opportunities 
to participate in professional development programs—such as conferences and 
workshops—outside the agency. 
Efforts to establish a talented professional staff in many countries take place 
without the benefit of university programs that teach courses in competition 
economics and law in early phases of the competition system.121 But successful 
competition law systems and other regulatory regimes invariably draw upon 
indigenous academic hubs that teach competition law and industrial organization 
economics, and generate research that informs policy development.122 Here, too, 
the formation of these capabilities from scratch is an important but difficult and 
lengthy process.123 
C. Predictable Challenges In, And Resistance From, The Courts 
In nearly every jurisdiction with a competition law, initial efforts to exercise 
the enforcement agency’s powers have elicited robust challenges in the courts by 
affected firms.124 Most agencies spend at least a decade defending challenges to 
every significant aspect of their authority, including the power to gather 
information, the application of the substantive mandate to challenge business 
behavior, and the power to impose sanctions.125 It can easily take two decades or 
 
attract lateral candidates with substantial experience in law firms or other government agencies.  Success 
in attracting higher quality staff also depended on the agency’s ability to portray itself as an exciting, 
dynamic place to pursue a career.  Another example of an agency that is seeking to upgrade its staff as a 
means for improvement is Argentina.  The Argentina Competition Commission is undergoing a major 
makeover and has added thirty new professionals in the current year. Interview with Pablo Trevisan, 
Commissioner, Argentina Competition Commission, New York, New York (Oct. 28, 2016).    
 121.  See Kovacic, Institutional Foundations, supra note 1, at 272 (describing importance of indigenous 
academic bodies). 
 122.  Id. 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  See generally Marc Winerman & William E. Kovacic, Outpost Years for a Start-Up Agency: The 
FTC from 1921–1925, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 145 (2010) (detailing the early travails of the U.S. Federal 
Trade Commission before the federal courts). 
 125.   We derive this estimate from conversations with current and former competition agency heads 
who described the early experience of their agencies before the courts. See, e.g., Interview with Eduardo 
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more for an agency to obtain judicial rulings—often from the jurisdiction’s 
highest court—that either sustain the agency’s efforts to exercise its legal 
mandate, or make clear that further legislative reforms are necessary.126 
In most jurisdictions, courts in the early implementation period are likely to 
regard the competition law with wariness or ambivalence.127 Few judges will have 
any previous familiarity with competition law concepts.128 As a consequence, 
judges will tend to focus closely on apparent deviations from procedural 
requirements established in the competition law or imposed by the jurisdiction’s 
administrative procedure code.129 In Mexico, for example, the competition 
system’s first decade was stymied by the judicial habit of routinely issuing 
injunctions to cure apparent failures by the competition agency to abide by 
procedural mandates.130 Programs that provide judicial training in competition 
law can improve the capacity of courts to deal with substantive issues, but these 
programs take time to develop, even if only to create interest among judges to 
participate in the training exercises. 
D. Responding To Changes In Agency Leadership 
It is important to monitor how an agency fares following leadership changes. 
Some agencies have gotten off to a seemingly great start by reason of highly 
visible and capable leadership. Many of these have descended rapidly in 
 
Perez Motta, Former President of Mexico’s Competition Commission, Washington, D.C. (Apr. 7, 2016); 
Interview with Joseph Wilson, Commissioner, Competition Commission of Pakistan, Geneva, 
Switzerland (July 15, 2016). 
 126.  We base this estimate on discussions with current and former heads of competition agencies who 
described their agencies’ early experiences before the courts. See supra notes 42–46 and accompanying 
text. In some jurisdictions, the initial period of judicial interpretation might be shorter. The 20-year 
estimate reflects the time needed, in most jurisdictions, for the agency to begin to exercise its powers and 
to issue decisions, for the parties to seek judicial review, and for matters to make their way to decision 
by the highest court in the jurisdiction. There may be several trips to the nation’s highest courts—for 
example, one litigation cycle to test the agency’s powers to use compulsory process to gather information, 
and a separate cycle to test the agency’s interpretation of the law and the evidence before it. We also 
note the experience of the Federal Trade Commission, which required decades to gain judicial 
endorsement of key elements of its authority. See William E. Kovacic, The Federal Trade Commission 
and Congressional Oversight of Antitrust Enforcement, 17 TULSA L. REV. 587, 611–17 (1982) [hereinafter 
Congressional Oversight]. 
 127.  See Kovacic, Institutional Foundations, supra note 1, at 306 (discussing weaknesses of courts in 
transition economies); Kovacic, Perspectives, supra note 49, at 1211. In many conversations about his 
experiences in transition economies, Frederic Jenny has emphasized the tendency of judges in civil law 
jurisdictions to focus carefully on issues of procedural and administrative correctness and to shrink from 
engaging in the economic and legal issues presented by many competition law cases. This explanation 
matches experience in the first decade of Mexico’s law, where the courts scanned the work of the 
competition agency for procedural imperfections. Interview with Eduardo Perez Motta, Former 
President, Mexican Competition Commission, Washington, D.C. (Apr. 7, 2016).  
 128.  Id. 
 129.  Id. 
 130.  See Aydin, Competition Law and Policy in Mexico, supra note 63, at 170–71; Sergio Garcia-
Rodriguez, Mexico’s New Institutional Framework for Antitrust Enforcement, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1149, 
1177 (1995) (In mid-1990s, Mexico’s “judicial system is perceived by many as plagued with considerable 
delays, institutional corruption, and a lack of independence”). 
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performance when the first generation leader departs and a less capable 
successor takes office. Newer agencies, just like older agencies, can suffer from 
the rivalry and jealousy that can characterize relationships between current and 
former leaders.131 As illustrated by the Polish example, several handoffs will be 
necessary to determine if the government remains committed to appointing high 
quality officials and whether the agency succeeds in embedding good process and 
analytical capability in the institution itself—rather than relying chiefly on the 
skill of a given leader. After several leadership changes, it is also possible to assess 
whether leaders have accepted a norm that defines success in terms of the 
agency’s achievements and suppresses the impulse for individual credit-claiming 
and blame-casting. 
E. Overcoming Economic And Political Shocks 
The first twenty to twenty-five years of a competition system’s operation 
provide a rough idea of its capacity to respond to external economic and political 
shocks that occur, in various forms, in all jurisdictions. At some point, often in 
the first decades of its existence, a competition system will be tested by economic 
or political upheaval. Like a sailing ship lashed by a storm, the agency must 
manage to stay afloat during the immediate crisis and to resume its intended 
course once the conflict has abated.132 No competition agency, old or new, will 
survive if it takes its political support’s depth and durability for granted, or 
assumes that social acceptance of competition as a principle of economic  
 
 
 
 131.  We offer an example based on conversations with current and former officials of a transition 
economy competition agency that had an older law but received a significant upgrade during the 2000s. 
The officials asked that the identity of the jurisdiction not be disclosed. The first head of the retooled 
agency undertook an ambitious program of enforcement. The first chair departed, and the original chair’s 
successor (who had been a protégé of the chair) developed an acrimonious relationship with the original 
chair. The original chair publicly accused the successor of professional misconduct and privately criticized 
the work of the agency after the handover of leadership. The successor matched the original chair blow-
for-blow in public discussions and in private conversations. Kovacic visited the headquarters of the 
agency and saw a wall on which the photographs of all previous members of the commission appeared, 
save one—the picture of the previous chair and voluble critic of the current chair. The empty space in 
the gallery stood out. Kovacic asked the current chair about the omission. The current chair replied that 
the photograph would not be displayed during the current chair’s tenure. The feud did nothing to advance 
the cause of the agency. 
 132.  An instructive example involving an older competition system is the response of the European 
Union’s Competition Directorate to the financial crisis that began in 2008. The desperation to restore the 
soundness of banks within the European Union created extreme pressures to override existing 
competition law requirements, including the regime that limits state aid. The Commissioner for 
Competition (Neelie Kroes) fought a valiant and successful battle to sustain the role of the Competition 
Directorate in scrutinizing state subsidies, including bailouts for financial institutions. The crisis had the 
possibility for severely damaging the Competition Directorate’s role in economic policymaking and, for 
the longer term, diminishing its effectiveness. We are grateful to Philip Lowe, who served as Director 
General for the Competition Directorate during the crisis, for recounting this episode in numerous 
conversations over the past five years. See also An Interview with Sir Philip Lowe, Non-Executive Director 
of the Board of the UK Competition and Markets Authority, 11 COMPETITION L. INT’L 99, 104–05 (Oct. 
2015) (recounted some aspects of DG Competition’s response to the financial crisis that began in 2008).  
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organization is so profound and enduring that no shift in economic fortunes can 
unseat it.133 
All agencies have encountered challenges that test their ability to take a 
punch and keep fighting. Vigorous law enforcement can create political backlash 
that inspires ministers and legislators to intervene destructively in the 
competition agency’s work.134 Changes in economic conditions can erode support 
for competition as a principle of economic organization.135 Political support also 
can evaporate amid political upheaval or conflict: political upheaval can render 
competition law a subordinate political concern, or make the competition regime 
entirely irrelevant.136 These challenges are daunting for older agencies, and are 
even more taxing for relatively new systems. Even a new system that appears to 
have weathered its early years in good condition and set a sound foundation for 
future improvements can be bruised by economic and political upheaval.137 
One other trend characterizes the development of new systems and the 
impact of economic and political shocks. In many countries, the initial design of 
a competition regime places the new institution within a government ministry or 
other departments subject to control of elected officials.138 This can be 
interpreted as the political regime’s distrust of the new system. Or somewhat 
more positively, it can be viewed as a desire to place the new institution under 
closer observation.139 Over a period of years, many countries with new systems 
have been willing to give the competition agency greater autonomy.140 Thus, 
 
 133.  See generally William E. Kovacic, Congress and the Federal Trade Commission, 57 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 869 (1988) (discussing periodic legislative assaults on FTC’s authority and specific enforcement 
matters since 1914).  
 134.  See Kovacic, Congressional Oversight, supra note 126, at 623–27, 664–67 (describing episodes of 
destructive congressional intervention in FTC’s programs). 
 135.  A good case can be made that the U.S. competition laws did not become mainstream elements 
of national economic policy until the late 1930s, following the abandonment of central planning initiatives 
tried in the First New Deal. TONY A. FREYER, ANTITRUST AND GLOBAL CAPITALISM, 1930–2004, 8–
59 (2006); TONY A. FREYER, REGULATING BIG BUSINESS: ANTITRUST IN GREAT BRITAIN AND 
AMERICA 1880–1990, 196–232 (1992).  
 136.  We offer the examples of Egypt and Ukraine. Egypt’s competition system got off to a promising 
start following the adoption of a competition law in 2005. It recruited well and created a strong 
administrative infrastructure under its first chair, Mona Yassine. Less than a decade later, a series of 
tumultuous political events rocked the competition system and, for a time, essentially suspended the 
operation of the competition regime. In recent years, the Egyptian Competition Agency has gotten back 
on its feet and restored its program. Ukraine was a generally encouraging case from the passage of the 
country’s antimonopoly act in the early 1990s. Within the past five years, the country has undergone a 
political revolution, the occupation of substantial territory in its eastern regions, and grave economic 
distress. Over the past year, the Antimonpoly Committee of Ukraine has undergone a basic makeover 
and can now be likened to a new start-up agency. 
 137.  See infra note 146 and accompanying text. 
 138.  See Marianela Lopez-Galdos, Results of the George Washington University Global 
Competition Benchmarking Survey (2016) [hereinafter Benchmarking] (describing patterns in location 
of competition agencies within the framework of government). 
 139.  This also could be seen as a willingness of a country to provide political support for the new 
institution. See Aydin & Büthe, supra note 1, at 29–32. 
 140.  See supra note 130 and accompanying text describing change in status of Mexico’s competition 
agency. 
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agencies that initially were subject to closer political control have gained a greater 
measure of independence over time. 
F. Demonstrating Resilience 
To a large degree, all of these considerations reveal the competition system’s 
resilience. It takes at least twenty years to see if the agency has generated positive 
accomplishments like successfully attacking cartels or adjusting anti-competitive 
government policies in response to effective advocacy. But this time period is also 
required for the agency to demonstrate its ability to take a punch and keep 
moving forward. 
These punches can take many forms: a major case that fails in the courts, a 
powerful industry lobbying campaign to induce legislators to withdraw funding 
or authority, an improper disclosure of confidential information that casts doubt 
on the agency’s procedural safeguards, or, worse, an episode of corruption 
involving a top agency official.141 It is important to know if the agency can cope 
well with adversity and, if it has committed errors, repair problems and improve 
performance going forward. 
An agency’s resilience is further tested when a jurisdiction restructures the 
institutions responsible for implementation. Over the past ten years, a number of 
jurisdictions have made fundamental changes to their competition agencies. 
France, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom each took two separate 
national competition agencies and consolidated policy responsibility into single 
institutions.142 Brazil combined the competition responsibilities of three distinct 
bodies into a single authority.143 Ireland merged its competition agency and 
consumer protection authority into one institution.144 After creating a single 
competition agency from two existing bodies, Spain then formed an omnibus 
regulatory body consisting of the competition agency and six sectoral 
regulators.145 
Such structural realignment can be a source of considerable upheaval. The 
new institution must perform both challenging conceptual tasks—for example, 
how to define the purpose and identity of the new institution—and seemingly 
mundane administrative tasks—such as joining up two separate information 
technology systems—whose successful completion is necessary for a smooth 
transition. The transition from the predecessor institutions to the new 
configuration, from the announcement of the planned redesign through the 
 
 141.  Experience with Indonesia’s competition system provides such a grim example. One of its 
commissioners has been convicted of taking a bribe in 2008 in connection with an abuse of dominance 
matter. 
 142.  David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic, Competition Agency Design: What’s On the Menu?, 8 
EUR. COMPETITION J. 527, 528–29 (2012) (describing structural changes in France, Portugal, Spain and 
the United Kingdom). 
 143.  Id. The Netherlands also merged its consumer protection authority, its competition agency, and 
the regulator responsible for postal services and telecommunications into one entity. 
 144.  Lopez-Galdos, Benchmarking, supra note 138. 
 145.  See generally id. 
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launch and early operations of the new body, creates an inevitable amount of 
disarray and comes at some cost in effectiveness.146 
G. Realistic Expectations 
The factors set out here caution against embracing unrealistic expectations 
about what a new competition system is likely to achieve in its first decade or two. 
Part IV explains that the performance of a competition system depends crucially 
on matters such as funding and human capital.147 Competition agencies that are 
weakly funded and situated in jurisdictions with a weak talent pool must 
implement the law more gradually than agencies blessed with substantial 
financial resources and first-rate talent can.148 Even for the best-resourced agency 
with superb staff, it can take considerable time to become proficient in tasks such 
as law enforcement or competition advocacy. There is no such thing as an “easy” 
cartel case or “simple” dawn raid for an agency that has never done one.149 The 
essential architecture of a leniency program may seem fairly straightforward 
(give immunity for the first cartel member to inform), but the routine application 
of leniency schemes presents extraordinary complexities that can perplex even 
the most-experienced regimes.150 
There is a chronic tendency to underestimate the administrative burdens 
imposed by statutory or regulatory requirements that compel the competition 
agency to devote resources to certain types of matters. Examples include 
compulsory merger notification with mandatory waiting periods and 
administrative law requirements that force the agency to investigate all 
complaints brought to its attention with little or no discretion to brush aside 
 
 146.  The announcement of an intended structural change—either a merger of agencies or functions, 
or a divestiture of some policy duties—immediately inspires speculation within the staff of the affected 
agencies about their place in the new regime. The uncertainties associated with a realignment will cause 
some employees to pursue other career opportunities. When departures reach a certain level, vital 
institutional memory walks out the door. 
 147.  See infra Part IV. 
 148.  See Kovacic, Institutional Foundations, supra note 1, at 298–301 (discussing possibilities for 
phased introduction of competition law system); Rodriguez & Menon, supra note 15. 
 149. We have not conducted a systematic survey, but our interviews suggested that many new agencies 
take years before conducting their first dawn raid.  The Competition Authority of Kenya, for example, 
performed its first dawn raid shortly after the fifth anniversary of the creation of the agency.  Interview 
with Francis Kariuki, Director General, Competition Authority of Kenya, Nairobi, Kenya (Sept. 14, 
2016). Serbia’s competition authority conducted its first dawn raid in its tenth year. Interview with 
Dragen Penezic, Secretary General, Commission for Protection of Competition in the Republic of Serbia, 
Belgrade, Serbia (Apr. 11–12, 2016). 
 150. In no particular order, a list of complications includes the following issues: the treatment of 
informants who were deeply involved in the formation of a cartel, but also are offering high quality 
evidence to the prosecutor; the level of protection to be given to informants who are not first to report 
wrongdoing, but have evidence whose quality surpasses that provided the first application; the 
completeness of information the leniency applicant must provide to qualify for immunity; the relationship 
of leniency to private rights of action for damages (for example, whether a party seeking compensation 
for injuries may obtain access to information provided by the leniency applicant). Interview with Marvin 
Price, Head of the Criminal Section, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, Lima, Peru (Aug. 20, 
2016). 
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manifestly insignificant matters in favor of pursuing more economically 
meaningful priorities.151 There is a lengthy learning process by which agencies 
adapt to cope effectively with these and similar mandates. 
This article’s call for realism in assessing the implementation experience of 
any single agency is grounded in the value of comparative study. In response to a 
question about how an individual competition agency is performing, one might 
ask, “Compared to what?” The comparative perspective provides a more reliable 
view of what agencies are able to do. If a large number of hardworking, intelligent 
people require a certain amount of time to complete certain tasks, it is unrealistic 
to expect others to do notably better. As in sport, incremental advances in 
performance can be expected over time, and specific agencies may achieve major 
advances with respect to some tasks. On the whole, progress takes place in 
smaller steps, and “records” in this field generally are not broken in giant leaps. 
IV 
LIFECYCLES 
The accumulated experience of new systems since the late 1980s 
demonstrates three principal implementation trajectories: an initial ascent 
followed by decline; a flat line; and a gradual upward progression. This article 
calls these trajectories lifecycles. They suggest patterns in how agencies evolve, 
and the study of the patterns can inform agencies about what to expect as they 
seek to implement a competition law. 
A. Early Ascent Followed By Decline 
One cohort of systems rose early and then entered a sustained period of 
decline. In some cases, the first period consisted of a sharp vertical ascent 
followed by a descent almost as dramatic as the initial climb. Venezuela’s 
competition system fits this profile.152 In the early years, such agencies are often 
heralded as success stories.153 A strong first-generation leader—for example, Ana 
Julia Jatar in Venezuela—who succeeds in bringing superior talent into the 
agency in its first years typically propels this ascent.154 The decline is set in motion 
by various factors: the charismatic leader’s departure without the development 
 
 151.  COMESA initially set low reporting thresholds for mergers subject to its regional merger review 
mechanism. The low thresholds generated additional income for COMESA (because more transactions 
were reportable) but at the cost of straining the capacity of the small secretariat assigned to review 
transactions. Interview with George Lipimile, Director General, COMESA Competition Unit, New 
York, New York (Oct. 28, 2016).  
 152.  Marianela Lopez-Galdos, Noches De Boda Para El Derecho De La Competencia En Venezuela 
[Venezuela’s Competition Law’s Honeymoon], GACETA JURIDICIA DE LA UNION EUROPEA Y DE LA 
COMPETENCIA (May 2007). 
 153.  Ana Julia Jatar, Venezuela Competition Policy: The Promotion of Social Change, in 
COMPETITION POLICY, DEREGULATION, AND MODERNIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA (Moises Naim 
ed., 1999). 
 154.  See Kovacic, Entrepreneur, supra note 50, at 456–57 (describing role of Ana Julia Jatar in 
establishment of Venezuela’s competition agency). 
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of an institutional framework to carry on the agency’s work; a change in national 
political leadership that results in a redirection of policy; or a legal dispute that 
casts doubt on the legitimacy of the framework.155 
In some instances, the collapse associated with this scenario is not complete, 
but rather a noticeable descent from the early period of seemingly effective 
implementation. Argentina and Peru are prominent examples in this category.156 
The agency does not crash into the ground, but descends to a level of 
performance that is decidedly modest compared to its initial accomplishments. In 
this case, the agency stalls for some of the same reasons suggested above. It may 
also decline after a change in leadership that dramatically reorients the agency, 
like the political upheaval which led to the departure of Beatriz Boza and the 
curtailment of INDECOPI’s authority in Peru,157 or in response to the emergence 
of political philosophies questioning the value of market-oriented reforms as in 
Argentina.158 
Political turmoil inspired by discontent with market reforms deeply affects 
the competition law regime. In some instances, anti-market political movements 
have placed the competition policy system into a holding pattern during which 
the best case scenario is that the agency can hope to retain a critical mass of its 
top staff, who devote themselves during the hiatus to research and analysis tasks 
in anticipation of a future resumption of operations.159 In the worst case, the 
repudiation of market processes converts the competition agency into a 
Frankenstein’s monster, retarding, rather than promoting, competition. 
In some instances, political upheaval has been debilitating. In recent years, a  
political and economic crisis in Ukraine, coupled with the Russian annexation of 
Crimea and a war in the country’s eastern regions, has threatened to destroy a 
competition system that was formed in the early 1990s and had shown gradual, 
though uneven, progress in its first two decades.160 In 2014, economic and political 
 
 155.  Bruce M. Owen, Competition Policy in Latin America (Oct. 2003) (Stanford Law and Economics 
Olin Working Paper No. 268), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=456441 [https://perma.cc/E5EB-
FZ4W]. 
 156.  Anna Julia Jatar & Luis Tineo, Five Years of Competition Policy in Peru: Challenges in the 
Transition to a Market Economy, in PERU’S EXPERIENCE IN MARKET REGULATORY REFORM: 
LESSONS FROM THE FIRST FIVE YEARS OF INDECOPI: 1992–1998 (Beatriz Boza ed., 1998). 
 157.  See ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., PERU – PEER REVIEW OF COMPETITION LAW 
AND POLICY, 15–16 (2004), https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/34728182.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
HMK9-HMV5] (outlining the narrowing of Indecopi’s powers in the early 2000s).  
 158.  See Julian Pena, Promoting Competition Policies from the Private Sector in Latin America, in 
COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA 469 (Eleanor M. Fox & D. Daniel Sokol eds., 
2009) (discussing how retreat from market liberalization impeded development of competition law in 
Argentina). 
 159.  This arguably describes the situation faced by competition authorities in countries such as 
Venezuela and Zimbabwe. 
 160. The largely successful launch and early implementation of Ukraine’s competition system is 
recounted in Roger Alan Boner & William E. Kovacic, Antitrust Policy in Ukraine, 31 GEO. WASH. J. 
INT’L L. 1 (1997).  The second decade of Ukraine’s competition regime features positive contributions, 
but several elements of the system attracted criticism, especially its merger control mechanism. See 
UNCTAD Ukraine Peer Review, supra note 41, at 7–8, 23–24 (reviewing accomplishments of Ukraine’s 
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turmoil pressed the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine to the edge of its 
existence161 Among other consequences, the crisis led Ukraine’s government to 
impose drastic economic austerity measures, including a seventy percent cut in 
the Antimonopoly Commission’s budget, which forced most agency officials to 
take involuntary half-time leave and caused numerous managers and staff to 
leave the agency.162 In mid-2015, the government reconstituted the 
Antimonopoly Commission with a new chair and a new board.163 To a significant 
degree, the institution is, in effect, being re-created from the ground up. 
Egypt’s competition system provides a similar example. While it enjoyed a 
promising start with good funding and inspired leadership, the country’s political 
turmoil following the Arab Spring uprising placed the competition policy system 
into virtual suspension. During this time, the agency has strived to retain, with 
mixed success, many of its best professionals, who devoted themselves during the 
hiatus to research and analysis tasks in anticipation of a future resumption of 
operations.164 
These examples do not mean that agencies cannot rebound from decline 
following a promising start. In Argentina, the recent regime change has yielded 
a new commitment to improve the performance of the competition system and 
the appointment of capable new leadership to the competition agency.165 
Additionally, there are promising signs of improvement in Peru, a country whose 
system once stood atop the ladder in Latin American and is now striving to regain 
that position.166 At this year’s Annual Conference of the International 
Competition Network in Singapore, Peru’s competition agency was honored for  
 
 
competition system and noting areas for improvement, including merger control). 
 161.  Interview with Yuri Yevgenev, Chairman, Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine, Kiev, Ukraine 
(July 22, 2016). 
 162.  Id. 
 163.  Id.  See also Interview with Yuriy Terentyev, Chairman, Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine, 
15 ANTITRUST SOURCE 6 (July 2016), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/ 
antitrust_source/aug16_full_source.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/QR7C-ATRE] (discussing 
restoration of Ukraine competition agency). 
 164. On the turbulent political conditions in Egypt following the Arab Spring revolution and its 
effects on Egypt’s competition system, see Peter Speelman, Competition Law in the Middle East and 
Northern Africa: The Experiences of Gunisia, Jordan, and Egypt, 4 N.Y.U.J. INT’L L & P. 1227, 1245–50 
(Summer 2016). See also Waleed Shoukry, Egypt: Overview, in THE AFRICAN AND MIDDLE EASTERN 
ANTITRUST REVIEW 2015 17, 18 (Glob. Competition Rev. 2014) (“The past three years have been a 
period of political cynicism, unprecedented violence and economic dislocation in Egypt.  Competition 
law was one of the tools that was used to target businessmen and market players who were close to the 
presidential palace.”).  More recently, the Egyptian Competition Authority has had success in restoring 
its law enforcement program and, generally, resuming normal operations. Interview with Mona El Garf, 
GLOB. COMPETITION REV. (Oct. 28, 2016), http://www.globalcompetitionreview.com/features/article/ 
42073/an-interview-mona-el.garf/ [https://perma.cc/ZR3J-2U5Y].  
 165.  Argentina announces new authority head, GLOB. COMPETITION REV. (Feb. 2016), http://global 
competitionreview.com/news/article/40525/argentina-announces-new-head-authority/ [https://perma.cc/ 
53PC-HUVE]. 
 166.  We base this observation on discussions that Kovacic conducted with INDECOPI’s staff and 
leadership in Lima, Peru on August 19–21, 2016. 
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its program to discourage other government bodies (for example, legislatures, 
other regulatory agencies) from adopting competition-retarding policies.167 
B. The Flat Line 
A second trajectory resembles a flat line. Some new systems never get off the 
ground after the adoption of the law and the formation of the competition 
agency. For various reasons, they are unable to apply their nominal powers to 
enforce the law or perform advocacy tasks.168 Some systems fail to receive the 
minimum necessary levels of funding. This ordinarily occurs in jurisdictions that 
suffer from severe poverty and do not enjoy financial support from external 
sources such as foreign aid agencies or multinational donors, which can 
supplement the budget.169 In other systems, like Paraguay’s, an absence of 
political support for competition law has stalled implementation. This can be the 
result of the appointment of leaders who are committed to inactivity or be due to 
a conscious refusal to provide needed resources.170 For example, in the 
Dominican Republic, the competition agency still awaits the appointment of an 
official who, by law, must approve the initiation of law enforcement proceedings, 
five years after its creation.171 The Dominican Republic agency has established a 
substantial program to train its personnel and, it engages in advocacy measures 
like public education; yet the agency is unable to apply enforcement powers that, 
on the surface, were a major reason for the creation of the regime.172 In yet other 
countries, such as Thailand, the courts have struck down a key feature of the 
implementation mechanism, and the jurisdiction’s political leadership has not 
adopted a substitute device.173 
 
 167.  World Bank, Winners Announced for Global Competition Advocacy Contest (Apr. 28, 2016), 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2016/04/28/winners-announced-for-global-
competition-advocacy-contest (recognizing Peru for “embedding competition principles in public and 
industrial policies through advocacy).  
 168.  See Aydin & Büthe, supra note 1. 
 169.  See, e.g., Cynthia Clement et al., Competition Policies for Growth: Legal and Regulatory 
Framework for Sub-Saharan African Countries (IRIS Center, University of Maryland, 2001) (describing 
resource impediments to development of competition policy in various African countries). 
 170.  See Julian Pena, Promoting Competition Policies from the Private Sector in Latin America, in 
COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA 469 (Eleanor M. Fox & D. Daniel Sokol eds., 
2009) (discussing impact of erosion of political support for competition law and other market-oriented 
reforms in Latin America). 
 171.  Interview with Michelle Cohen, President, Commission for the Defense of Competition, 
Dominican Republic, Geneva, Switzerland (July 7, 2015).  In September, Cohen was fired by the 
Domincan Republic’s Chamber of Deputies.  More questions into firing of Dominican competition 
watchdog chief, Domican Today, (Sept. 15, 2016), http://www.dominicantoday.com/dr/local/ 
2016/9/15/60609/More-questions-into-firing-of-Dominican-competition-watchdog-chief [https://perma. 
cc/EM3Z-8A4Y].  News reports have indicated that Cohen was dismissed in response the business 
community’s objections to Cohen’s exercise of the Pro Competencia’s advocacy and reporting functions.  
 172.  Interview with Michelle Cohen, supra note 171. 
 173.  R. Ian McEwin, Designing Competition Law under Financial Crisis: Indonesia and Thailand 
Compared, 10 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L, Spring 2014, at 247 (describing barriers to enforcement of 
Thailand’s competition law). Thailand’s government is considering proposals to cure this deficiency and 
otherwise strengthen the powers and status of the country’s competition authority.  Interview with 
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Agencies which have risen quickly and fallen and agencies what have never 
left the flat line are not irretrievably failed. In some cases, largely inactive 
agencies have begun to build programs that have promise of upward progression. 
For example, Armenia’s competition authority has recently shown signs of 
overcoming badly inadequate funding levels and an unfavorable political 
environment to take steps that could establish a useful program.174 Similarly, 
elected political leadership in Argentina is beginning to place the competition 
regime on better institutional footing and rely more heavily on competition 
policy to improve economic growth.175 The Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine 
is in the early stages of rehabilitation following a political crisis that nearly 
destroyed the agency.176 
What explains the ability of dormant systems, or weakly performing 
institutions, to gain the resources and political support needed to improve? In 
some instances, international organizations have helped inspire reforms by 
recommending improvements in the competition law system, including 
enhancements of the agency’s legal mandate, its resources, or its structure. The 
peer reviews issued by bodies such as the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development and the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development appear to have helped catalyze changes in government 
policy.177 
C. General Upward Progression 
The third trajectory is a generally upward progression with fluctuations 
upward and downward. The slope of progress can vary: some systems’ slopes are 
steep (Brazil, Singapore, South Africa) while others’ are more gradual 
(Barbados, Chile, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, Mexico). The trajectory usually is 
not an unbroken upward arc because the agency encounters successes and 
setbacks along the way. Mexico, for example, has achieved important 
improvements in its statutory framework and in the implementation of its law 
enforcement and advocacy programs. Yet, a recent redesign of the agency and a 
change in leadership resulted in a massive loss of senior management (with the 
departure of seventeen of the agency’s top eighteen managers in 2015).178 
 
Robert Ian McEwin, New York, New York (Oct. 28, 2016). 
 174.  UNITED NATIONS CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., VOLUNTARY PEER REVIEW OF COMPETITION 
LAW AND POLICY: ARMENIA (Aug. 2010), http://www.unctad.org/en/Docs/ditcclp20101_en.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/V52Q-YFA7].  
 175.  Interview with Esteban Grecco, Chairman of the Argentina’s Competition Commission, Mexico 
City, Mexico (May 16, 2016); Macri relanza la Comision Nacional de Competencia, DIARIO LA GACETA 
(Feb. 2016), http://www.gacetamercantil.com/notas/95421/ [https://perma.cc/PNM7-89UX].  
 176.  See ANTITRUST SOURCE, supra note 163 and accompanying text. 
 177.  At their best, peer reviews put the weight of a larger international community behind suggested 
reforms and give advocates of change a stronger basis for proposing improvements. 
 178.  Interview with Alejandra Palacios, President, Federal Competition Commission of Mexico, 
Mexico City (May 16, 2016); see also Interview with Alejandra Palacios, Chair, COFECE, Mexico, 15 
ANTITRUST SOURCE 5 (June 2016), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_ 
source/jun16_palacios_intrvw_6_17f.authcheckdam.pdf (“As an authority, we have experienced 
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Restocking the leadership team took time and  came at some cost in performance 
in the short term. 
In their first years, these gradually ever more successful systems often are not 
identified as rising stars. Recall that the competition regimes of Chile and Mexico 
were not seen as obvious candidates for success. However, over time, they have 
shown steady improvement and grown resilient as a result of better resourcing, 
staffing, program selection, and political support. A second factor is a regime 
change which brings in new political leadership committed to making 
competition law a more central element of national economic policy.  Just as a 
regime change can affect a competition system adversely, new political leadership 
can revive an ailing competition mechanism.179 
V 
FACTORS ACCOUNTING FOR IMPLEMENTATION SUCCESS 
Studying the lifecycles of various competition systems involves observing 
factors that tend to improve the prospects for successful implementation. 
A. Funding 
Well-funded agencies generally tend to outperform poorly resourced 
regimes.180 A condition that links many of the least successful systems is a dearth 
of resources from internal sources and an inability to enlist external donors to fill 
the gap.181 Some agencies enjoy robust financial support from their first days 
onward but a large budget from the start is by no means a prerequisite for success. 
Singapore and South Africa are two examples of agencies that have undergone 
gradual, steady improvements in implementation from the beginning.182 In other 
 
profound changes in the last two years.”). 
 179.  This condition describes current efforts by new political leadership to bolster Argentina’s 
competition system.  See Interview with Esteban Manuel Greco, President of the National Commission 
for the Defense of Competition, Argentina, 15 ANTITRUST SOURCE 5 (June 2016), https://www. 
competitionpolicyinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/CPI-Talks-Greco-Interview.pdf 
(“Argentina has a new approach to competition policy and this implies in the first place an intention to 
activgate competition law enforcement and competition policy.”). 
 180. Agency Effectiveness Study, 4 J. ANTITRUST ENF’T 2 (forthcoming 2016) (discussing importance 
of adequate funding to competition agency effectiveness). Substantial resources do not ensure 
effectiveness.  See Aydin & Büthe, supra note 1. Public and private bodies, alike, sometimes apply 
generous outlays poorly.  We are aware of one newer agency that devotes a third of its budget to the 
motor pool; top officials are assigned an automobile and driver.  Yet a dearth of funding places an agency 
at a severe disadvantage. 
 181.  Latin American enforcers bemoan administrative hurdles, GLOB. COMPETITION REV. (May 
2016). 
 182.  South Africa provides a good example of how the government underscored its support for the 
new competition system with the budget. The first quarters for the new Competition Commission of 
South Africa and the Tribunal in which it brings its cases was an elegant office park near Pretoria. The 
campus resembled the accommodations one might expect from a prosperous law firm or business 
venture. The institutions since have been relocated to facilities in Johannesburg, yet still in a manner that 
reflects the stature and importance of the competition agencies. Interview with Tembinkosi Bonakele, 
Chairman, Competition Commission of South Africa, Durbin, South Africa (Nov. 10, 2015). 
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jurisdictions, such as Colombia and Mexico, the gradual ascent of the competition 
system has benefited from periodic substantial increases in outlays that enhanced 
the capability of the competition agency and supported the pursuit of more 
ambitious law enforcement and advocacy programs.183 Agencies that 
demonstrate their ability to manage and apply a lesser allotment of resources 
place themselves in a stronger position to seek greater outlays in the future. 
B. Human Capital 
Funding, in turn, deeply influences a second vital condition: the ability to 
attract and retain top rate talent and to spend funds for external consultants.184 
An agency’s ability to establish effective law enforcement or advocacy programs 
hinges largely on its human capital.185 As the agency’s talent increases, it can 
undertake more ambitious programs. The level of skill should be paramount in 
the choice of enforcement and non-enforcement matters. 
C. Matching Commitments To Capabilities 
The more effective competition systems strive to match program 
commitments to delivery capabilities. A weakly resourced agency must strive to 
select programs that it has a fighting chance of carrying out successfully. This 
requires strong discipline in program selection to avoid making commitments to 
matters that the agency cannot execute successfully.186 A common trap an agency 
faces in early years is the tendency to begin a large number of highly ambitious 
matters that exceed the capability of staff and run serious risks of failure before 
the courts.187 
This points to a basic dilemma that confronts agency leaders in the early 
decades of a competition agency, and, perhaps, other new regulatory bodies: 
 
 183.  Interview with Alejandra Palacios, President, Mexican Competition Commission, Mexico City, 
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competition agency will struggle to recruit and retain skilled professionals. Interview with Yuri 
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in COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA 13 (Eleanor M. Fox & D. Daniel Sokol eds., 
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to consumers. In seeking to bolster its program in the 1970s, the agency initiated an extraordinary array 
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ambitious FTC matters begun in this period collapsed as a consequence. The FTC experience in the 1970s 
is examined in Hyman & Kovacic, Consume or Invest, supra note 58, at 305–11. 
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When allocating resources, what is the right balance between “consumption” in 
the form of initiating new law enforcement matters and “investments” in 
administrative infrastructure, procedures, knowledge, and other forms of 
capability that put the agency in a position to succeed for the long term?188 There 
is a critical mass of enforcement necessary for the agency to build credibility 
among business managers, develop the capacity of its staff, and attain legitimacy 
in the eyes of elected officials and the larger public.189 Therefore, a new agency 
may be forced to operate at a tempo that, to some extent, exceeds its ability to 
complete all of its projects successfully. But if the gap between early promises 
and actual delivery becomes too great, many projects will collapse in a manner 
that demoralizes the agency’s staff and creates a reputation for ineptitude. 
The relaunch of Pakistan’s competition system over the past decade 
illustrates the hazards of creating a serious mismatch between a program’s 
commitments and its capacities. The first generation of the reformed agency’s 
leadership undertook an agenda of high-profile challenges in major sectors of the 
economy.190 At first, these measures were seen as evidence of the agency’s new 
vitality and courage, replacing the timidity of the former system with bold acts. 
Within years, it became apparent that the agency lacked the capacity to capably 
manage a large number of ambitious projects, particularly in the face of strong 
resistance from the affected businesses, which enmeshed the agency in 
protracted, indeterminate litigation.191 
D. Learning 
Learning is one of the most important processes by which agencies adapt to 
cope effectively with the mandates they are entrusted to implement. As the 
competition authority accumulates experience, it can reasonably seek to conduct 
a larger number of inquiries or undertake individual matters of greater difficulty. 
Our perception is that the more effective agencies learn in two ways – from their 
own experience and from the experience of other competition law regimes— 
either directly from individual regimes or indirectly through the work of 
international bodies such as the International Competition Network, 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development.192 To learn from its own 
experience, the agency must devise a process for assessing its completed projects 
and its processes, and incorporating what it learns into its future work.193 In order 
 
 188.  Id. 322–24.  
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for any single agency to learn from the experience of other bodies, the agencies 
with experience must share what they know, the good and the bad, alike.194 
E. Political Support 
It is extraordinarily difficult to implement a competition policy program in a 
jurisdiction that is hostile or indifferent to the aims of the law. It is still more 
difficult to build a program amid political entropy. Weak political support or 
episodes of severe political instability inevitably lengthen the period for effective 
implementation of the competition law. By contrast, strong political support—
which the agency itself may help to build195—allows an agency to overcome many 
of the impediments noted above and enables it to focus on making the case for 
its work through its performance. 
F. Supporting Institutions 
The implementation of competition law depends heavily on the quality of 
supporting institutions, what Allan Fels refers to as “co-producers.”196 A crucial 
such institution for a competition agency is a country’s judicial system. A well-
functioning judicial system confers a great advantage on the development of the 
competition regime. By contrast, a country with feeble or, worse, corrupt courts 
faces a lengthy process of retooling its judiciary or establishing new tribunals 
dedicated to competition law.197 
A competition system also ultimately cannot thrive without the support of 
academic institutions that teach courses and perform research in competition law 
and industrial organization economics.198 The speed with which a jurisdiction 
develops a sound intellectual infrastructure will affect the pace and quality of 
implementation. 
G. International Cooperation 
Engagement with other jurisdictions can help agencies overcome resource 
limits, accelerate learning, and build political support.199 This goal can be 
 
improving agency performance).  
 194.  An agency must be willing to suppress the instinct to save face by concealing its failures or by 
attributing all good outcomes solely to its skill (rather than, for example, to sheer luck). It may be easier 
to do this in a setting—say, a small, closed meeting of senior competition agency officials—in which senior 
managers are willing to speak more freely. Since the early part of this decade, Kovacic has participated 
in a seminar hosted by the Fordham Law School in which 15–20 senior competition officials discuss 
sensitive topics (for example, dealing with political pressure applied by elected officials) that would be 
awkward to address in front of a large audience. This format facilitates a more open and informative 
discussion and has great potential to accelerate learning across agencies. 
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accomplished through bilateral programs of technical assistance, agency-to-
agency cooperation, or through participation in international regional alliances 
or larger international networks.200 To an increasing degree, these mechanisms 
enable agencies to obtain highly valuable information about the substance and 
process of competition law. Further, regular exchanges with their counterparts in 
other countries allows agency leaders to learn how to deal with sensitive issues 
involving political pressure and relations with other public agencies. 
H. Periodic Assessment And Upgrades 
The most successful implementation efforts have taken place in jurisdictions 
that undertake periodic reviews of the competition system.201 The virtuous cycle 
one observes in the best systems consists of a three-stage process of 
experimentation, assessment, and refinement.202 Many of these states, including 
Brazil, Mexico, South Korea, and Taiwan, have returned to their national 
legislatures to obtain major system upgrades.203 
VI 
CONCLUSION 
In his influential study of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Graham Allison lamented 
the limits of our understanding of how much institutional arrangements (what he 
called “bureaucracy”) contributed to the failure of governments to achieve good 
policy results.204 To bridge the gap between expectations and actual performance, 
Allison called for a redirection of effort by students of public administration: “If 
analysts and operators are to increase their ability to achieve desired policy 
outcomes, . . . we shall have to find ways of thinking harder about the problem of 
‘implementation,’ that is, the path between preferred solution and actual 
performance of the government.”205 
The challenge Allison posed forty-five years ago applies powerfully to the 
modern expansion of competition law. The design and successful implementation 
of law reform are difficult tasks in any legal system. They are inherently even 
more difficult in developing and transition economies, dozens of which have 
adopted competition laws in the past twenty-five years. 
Generally, the path to success for new competition systems has been a process 
of incremental improvement. The best experiences have taken place in 
jurisdictions that have pursued gradual increases in the tempo and difficulty of 
projects undertaken. The need for a deliberate, phased approach is most acute in 
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countries with unfavorable initial conditions—badly funded agencies, weak 
political support, and thin human capital. 
  Our analysis of implementation programs to date suggests the value of 
greater emphasis on institution building as a dimension of competition law 
reforms. It also calls for patience in setting expectations about what most regimes 
are likely to be able to accomplish. 
The future development of competition law in newer systems requires a mix 
of realism and ambition. Competition agencies and their external constituencies 
must approach the establishment of the new regulatory regime with realistic 
expectations about what it takes to build an effective system in light of what 
jurisdictions have accomplished to date. Realism is an antidote to the 
disappointment and frustration that can set in when good results do not emerge 
in the early years of a law’s implementation. To develop a new system of effective 
economic regulation is a long-distance event, not a 100-meter sprint. 
Realism must be accompanied by ambition to press ahead and achieve the 
gradual improvement in institutional quality and operational methods that 
supply the foundation for good policy outcomes. Clear-sighted appreciation of 
implementation difficulties does not warrant surrender. As a number of new 
competition agencies have shown, the sustained commitment to a virtuous cycle 
of experimentation, assessment, and improvement can yield steady incremental 
improvements that build superior institutions—the foundation for superior 
policy performance. 
 
